

Independent Interim Review of the Australian National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security  
2012-2018

FINAL REPORT: 30 OCTOBER 2015

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
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# List of Acronyms

| ACC | Australian Civilian Corps |
| --- | --- |
| ACMC | Australian Civil-Military Centre |
| AFP | Australian Federal Police |
| AGD | Attorney General’s Department |
| ALNAP | Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action |
| ATT | Arms Trade Treaty |
| AusAID | Australian Agency for International Development |
| CDF | Chief of Defence Force |
| CEDAW | Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women |
| CSO | Civil Society Organisation |
| CVE | Countering Violent Extremism |
| DFAT | Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade |
| DIP | Defence Implementation Plan |
| GAI | WPS Global Acceleration Instrument |
| GR 30 | CEDAW General Recommendation No. 30 |
| IDWG | Inter-Departmental Working Group (on Women, Peace and Security) |
| IS | Islamic State |
| JOC | Joint Operations Command |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| NAP | National Action Plan |
| NGO | Non-Government Organisation |
| OfW | Office for Women |
| OSCE | Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe |
| PM&C | Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet |
| PSVI | Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative |
| Resolution 1325 | United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 |
| R2P | Responsibility to Protect |
| SCR | Security Council Resolution |
| SDGs | Sustainable Development Goals |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| WILPF | Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom |
| WPS | Women, Peace and Security |



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
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# Acknowledgments

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The Humanitarian Advisory Group team would like to thank the government and civil society representatives who shared their reflections and documentation and were generous with their time for this interim review.

The team would also like to thank the Women, Peace and Security Inter-Departmental Working Group Sub-Committee for its guidance and direction.

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# Executive summary

The *Australian National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2012-2018* (Australian NAP) is the Australian Government’s primary mechanism for fulfilling its commitment to turn the landmark United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) and the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda into action.

The Australian NAP calls for two independent reviews during the 2012–2018 period. The first is an interim review in 2015. The second is a final review to be conducted in 2018.

This report provides the findings from the **independent interim review of the Australian NAP**. The focus of the interim review was on tracking whole of government progress on the implementation of the actions under the Australian NAP, analysing their relevance against the intended outcomes, and analysing the relevance of the Australian NAP to inform actions to implement the WPS Agenda more broadly.

The interim review also assessed the extent to which the framework, actions and processes of the Australian NAP can sustain a final assessment of its effectiveness, including its capacity to address new and emerging issues in the WPS agenda and the critical role of civil society.

## Interim review findings

Sixteen key findings emerged from this independent interim review. These findings are structured against the five review themes and in Section 4 are accompanied by recommendations which are targeted to enhance implementation of the Australian NAP and Australia’s role in advancing the WPS agenda.

Relevance of current Australian NAP actions

**Finding 1:** The actions in the Australian NAP are relevant for implementing the WPS agenda because they align with the actions that Member States are encouraged to adopt in the eight WPS UNSC Resolutions.[[1]](#footnote-1)

**Finding 2:** The actions in the Australian NAP are relevant for implementing the WPS agenda because they are broad, and thereby offer flexibility to shape activities and respond to changes in the WPS landscape.

**Finding 3:** The broad, flexible approach that Australia has adopted is consistent with approaches adopted by other Member States.

Monitoring and evaluating the Australian NAP

**Finding 4:** The measures contained in the Australian NAP M&E framework are not sufficient to track progress because the measures do not cover the full spectrum of actions being implemented.

**Finding 5:** The absence of an overarching goal and specific targets within the Australian NAP M&E framework restrict the ability to measure progress.

**Finding 6:** The absence of a baseline study restricts the ability to measure progress.

**Finding 7:** The measures contained in the Australian NAP M&E framework are not sufficient to track impact because the measures do not include outcome statements of the change that is desired.

**Finding 8:** The measures contained in the Australian NAP M&E framework are quantitative, not qualitative in nature.

Implementing the Australian NAP actions: gaps and challenges

**Finding 9:** The whole of government approach to implementing the Australian NAP can be strengthened.

**Finding 10:** The extent to which agencies embed implementation of the Australian NAP is uneven; this results in limited institutionalisation and Australian NAP awareness in some agencies.

**Finding 11:** There is uneven funding and resource allocation across implementing agencies.

Opportunities for collaboration between government and civil society

**Finding 12**: The Australian Government values the role of civil society in implementing the WPS agenda, however opportunities for formal engagement are limited.

**Finding 13**: There is a desire from civil society to increase engagement, however resourcing is a limiting factor.

**Finding 14**: There are challenges around coordination for civil society and its strategic approach to engaging with government on Australian NAP issues.

Laying the groundwork for the final review in 2018

**Finding 15:** The final review of the Australian NAP will need to be intrinsically linked to the revision process for the second iteration of the Australian NAP.

**Finding 16**: A rigourous, participatory review framework will be needed to undertake the final review in 2018.

Based on this interim review, the key principles to guide the final review are:

* planning for utilisation
* independence and impartiality
* accountability and learning
* prioritising contribution over attribution of impact
* promoting dialogue and cooperation among stakeholders
* integrating gender equality.

In preparation for the final review, consideration has been given to relevant questions. Examples of these questions include:

1. To what extent are objectives of the programme still relevant?
2. Are activities and outputs consistent with the overall goal and intended impact?
3. To what extent have the stated objectives within the NAP been achieved?
4. What impact has the NAP had for women in conflict-affected countries?
5. What positive changes have been achieved across the strategies?
6. What positive changes have occurred in each implementing agency in relation to policies, programmes and approaches to WPS?
7. Do the government’s policies and approaches to peace, security and humanitarian affairs provide policy coherence with the NAP and the WPS agenda?
8. Are the policies of all government implementing departments and agencies of relevance to WPS complementary to the NAP?
9. Are any elements of the work undertaken by various stakeholders contradictory?
10. What steps can be taken to improve complementarity of work?

## Corresponding recommendations

| **Relevance of current  Australian NAP actions** | **Key finding** | **Corresponding recommendations for the Australian Government** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | Maintain a broad approach to actions with the Australian NAP, allowing agencies to build activities that advance the WPS agenda and align with individual agency strengths and priorities. |
| 2 | Build assessment of new and emerging issues into the Australian NAP to encourage agencies to consider new developments and approaches to further advance the WPS agenda.  Maintain flexibility to adjust activities according to changes in context – while still contributing to the Australian NAP actions and broader WPS agenda. |
| 3 | Monitor NAP reviews and evaluations by other Member States and feed learning into Australia’s implementation. |

| **Monitoring and evaluating the  Australian NAP** | **Key finding** | **Corresponding recommendations for the Australian Government** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 4 | Revise the measures in the Australian NAP M&E framework so that they can track progress of all the actions. |
| 5 | Develop a theory of change for the Australian NAP, including an overarching goal and specific targets for the Australian NAP against which progress can be measured. |
| 6 | Strengthen baseline data, including through a stocktake or audit by each implementing agency and through reporting financial allocations for Australian NAP implementation in preparation for the final review in 2018. |
| 7 | Revise the measures in the Australian NAP so that they can measure impact and effectiveness of the actions and strategies, including clear outcomes that are being sought. |
| 8 | Supplement existing quantitative measures with qualitative indicators to reflect perceptions of impact, including unintended consequences of activities undertaken under the Australian NAP.  Conduct a workshop to undertake joint analysis of the emerging trends to provide complementary qualitative data for the 2016 progress report.  Supplement quantitative data on numbers of Australian Government personnel trained before deploying to conflict or post-conflict settings with post-deployment perceptions about the impact and applicability of WPS training for day-to-day operations. |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Implementing the Australian NAP actions:  gaps and challenges** | **Key finding** | **Corresponding recommendations for the Australian Government** |
| 9 | Develop a publicly available whole of government implementation plan to strengthen transparency and coordination across agencies, encourage joint initiatives and facilitate institionalisation of the Australian NAP. |
| 10 | Undertake a ‘stocktake’ or audit in the lead up to each progress report to enhance information sharing on all WPS activities and provide additional baseline data.  Make members of the WPS IDWG and its sub-committee designated WPS focal points who are accountable for Australian NAP implementation for their agency.  Release six-monthly informal WPS IDWG updates to enhance information sharing. |
| 11 | Enhance reporting on resourcing and financial allocations of Australian NAP implementation, including in the second Progress Report (to help prepare baseline for the final review and the Australian NAP revision).  Ensure there is a dedicated budget allocated to the Australian NAP implementation (linked to the whole of government implementation plan). |

| **Opportunities for collaboration between government and civil society** | **Key finding** | **Corresponding recommendations for the Australian Government and civil society** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 12 | Review and strengthen the Civil Society Engagement Strategy in a participatory process which ensures that diaspora groups, academia and research institutions are fully incorporated.  In partnership with civil society, identify opportunities for strategic and formal engagement such as joint training, sharing lessons learnt and country-specific learning opportunities on WPS issues. |
| 13 | Assess the feasibility of providing financial support to the secretariat for the Australian Civil Society Coalition for Women, Peace & Security, to better enable more effective outreach and coordination.  Secure resources for the Office for Women to increase the required information sharing, transparency and engagement. |
| 14 | Civil society should undertake a mapping exercise, with increased inclusion of different civil society actors, to enhance coordination with the government in relation to the Australian NAP. |

|  | **Key finding** | **Corresponding recommendations for the Australian Government** |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 15 | Ensure strong linkages between the Australian NAP revision and final review process to ensure the second iteration of the Australian NAP builds on learning highlighted in the final review. |
| **Laying the groundwork for the final review in 2018** | 16 | Review, assess and build on the proposed Final Review Framework. |

# 1. Introduction

In March 2012, the Australian Government adopted a *National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2012-2018* (Australian NAP). In so doing, it joined a growing global community of countries working to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and the broader women, peace and security agenda.

UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (Resolution 1325), adopted on 31 October 2000, is widely recognised as a landmark resolution. It represents the first time that the UN Security Council (UNSC) acknowledged the disproportionate impact of armed conflict on women, women‘s participation at the forefront of conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding, and women’s right to participate in these processes. It formally acknowledged that women’s participation, protection and a gender perspective are essential to the maintenance of international peace and security. These acknowledgments grew from previous commitments made by UN Member States, including the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action in 1995.

Resolution 1325 identified the need for action by the UN system and Member States in the following broad areas:

* Increasing participation of women in institutions and mechanisms related to conflict prevention, resolution and management, including UN field-based operations and peace processes.
* Adoption of a gender perspective in peace and security efforts, including peacekeeping operations, peace processes, and in the design of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programs and refugee camps and settlements.
* Protection of women and girls, and their rights, including in relation to sexual and gender-based violence.

Following Resolution 1325, the UNSC has adopted six additional resolutions on women, peace and security: 1820 (2009); 1888 (2009); 1889 (2010); 1960 (2011); 2106 (2013); 2122 (2013); and 2242 (2015). Four of these resolutions are particularly focused on conflict-related sexual violence (1820, 1888, 1960 and 2106). Together they represent and establish the (international normative) framework for the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda.

See Appendix A for a brief summary of the eight WPS resolutions.

## 1.1 Australian National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2012-2018

The Australian Government launched its NAP in 2012 after national consultations among government departments and agencies, representatives from civil society and non-government organisations (NGOs), and the wider Australian public (Australian Government 2014, p. 11).

The purpose of the Australian NAP is to:

* Articulate Australia’s ongoing commitment to implement Resolution 1325 and the broader UNSC Women, Peace and Security agenda.
* Establish a clear framework for a coordinated, whole of government approach to implementing Resolution 1325 and related resolutions.
* Identify strategies and actions that Australia will undertake both domestically and overseas to implement Resolution 1325 and related resolutions, and measure the effectiveness of this work over a six-year period from 2012–2018.
* Highlight the important work that Australia is doing in partnership with the international community to respond to women’s needs, recognise their roles, promote equal participation, and protect women and girls’ human rights in fragile, conflict and post-conflict settings (Australian Government 2012, p. 15).

In Australia the Office for Women (OfW) is the central coordinating body for the NAP.

Australian Government agencies responsible for implementation of the NAP are:

* Department of Defence (Defence)
* Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)
* Australian Federal Police (AFP)
* Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) – integrated into DFAT in 2013
* Attorney-General’s Department (AGD)
* Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC), identified separately, but also part of Defence
* Office for Women, formerly in the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA) and since 2013, in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C).

They are all represented in the WPS Inter-Departmental Working Group, which is the ‘primary mechanism responsible for Australia’s implementation of the NAP’ (Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 2013, p. 3).

The NAP comprises five high-level strategies, and 24 actions aligned to the five thematic areas identified by the UN:

* prevention
* participation
* protection
* relief and recovery
* normative (see Appendix B).

The NAP includes a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework (see Appendix C), which is intended to ‘track the progress of the [NAP] (Australian Government 2012, p. 20). According to the NAP, the measures are ‘proxies to assess the effectiveness of each strategy’ (Australian Government 2012, p. 20). The M&E framework is organised around the five strategies and consists of 16 measures allocated to responsible implementing agencies.

The government is required to release a progress report against measures in the M&E framework every two years; these reports are to be tabled in Australian Federal Parliament. The NAP also calls for two independent reviews during the 2012-2018 period. The first is an interim review in 2015. The second is a final review to be conducted in 2018.

## 1.2 Independent Interim Review

The intent of the NAP is not explicitly articulated in the NAP. Therefore, for the purposes of this review, the ‘intent of the NAP refers to the way in which the Australian Government will meet its obligations to implement the WPS agenda’. For the full scope of the review, see Appendix D.

The focus of the interim review has been on relevance, namely the extent to which the actions are suited to implement the WPS agenda. From the inception of the NAP, it was intended that the interim review assess ‘whether the actions under the [NAP] are still relevant’, and provide guidance for the remainder of the lifespan of the NAP, including advice about emerging issues in the WPS agenda (Australian Government 2012, p.27). The review provided an opportunity to step back and consider the following question: are we headed in the right direction? (rather than ‘how far have we travelled down the path?’). The review was broadly guided by the following definition of ‘relevance’, fit for purpose: relevance is the extent to which the activities of a programme are consistent with the overall goal/intent and the priorities and needs of the relevant sector/agenda.

Five review questions were identified to guide the interim review:

1. To what extent are the actions in the NAP relevant to implement the Women, Peace and Security agenda?
2. To what extent can the current monitoring and evaluation measures in the NAP track the progress and effectiveness of the NAP?
3. What are the gaps in, and challenges to, implementation of the NAP actions?
4. To what extent does the NAP provide opportunities for collaboration between government and civil society?
5. What is required to support a comprehensive evaluation of the NAP for the Final Review in 2018?

The interim review used a mixed methods qualitative approach to data collection, combining document review and stakeholder interviews.

1.2.1 Document review

A wide variety of literature was explored to determine the relevant issues and important recent developments in relation to the WPS agenda, to ensure a comprehensive understanding of relevant perspectives, lessons learnt and good practice globally and from other countries currently implementing NAPs, with a particular focus on non-conflict donor countries.

The document review was guided by the five review themes. Analysis of the NAP actions was based on a strategic-level analysis rather than a detailed action-by-action analysis.

**Main sources of data during the document review:**

1. Foundational documents, including the NAP, WPS resolutions and relevant UN Secretary-General reports.
2. Australian Government documentation, including reports, implementation plans, strategies, submissions, speeches and statements.
3. Global, regional and national progress reports, reviews and evaluations, with particular focus on other non-conflict donor countries.
4. NAPs and revisions from select non-conflict donor countries.
5. Australian academic literature (both published and grey literature).
6. Civil society analysis, including Australian annual report cards on NAP implementation, global civil society analyses and civil society analyses from other NAP countries.
7. UN, governmental and civil society reports and analyses on new and emerging issues, initiatives and processes.

1.2.2 Stakeholder interviews

Following the document review, interviews were conducted with representatives from government implementing agencies and Australian civil society experts, including from academia. The government agencies interviewed included Australian Defence, Australian Federal Police, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Office for Women in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Australian Civil-Military Centre. Australian civil society interviewees represented women’s rights, development and humanitarian organisations, universities, as well as diaspora organisations. A representative of the government of the Netherlands was also interviewed.

The intention of the mixed-methods approach was to use the stakeholder interviews to validate and test the findings from the document review. In practice, while considerable data was collected through the document review phase, the existing literature did not provide all the necessary data especially related to Australian experience of implementation. As a result, the interviews became a critical source of data as well as a means to test and explore findings from the document review. All quotes by interviewees used in this report are non-attributable.

More information about the interviews, including a list of the departments, agencies and organisations interviewed are in Appendix E.

**Limitations**

The limitations of the review related to uneven participation by implementing government agencies; poor uptake of an online civil society survey which was intended to enhance the feedback from civil society; availability of key stakeholders to be interviewed; and the lack of a clear definition of the intent of the NAP. These limitations are elaborated in Appendix F.

**WPS activity**

There has been significant WPS activity since the NAP was launched in 2012. While Australian work on WPS issues pre-dates its national action plan, the NAP has enabled increased and significant activity on WPS since its launch in 2012. Australia’s 2014 Progress Report provides an indication of this activity, demonstrating government implementation of the WPS agenda through a wide range of research, policy and programme avenues since 2012, including foreign policy, development assistance, capacity development, and military planning and operations (Australian Government 2014; Wittwer 2015).

As will be discussed under the theme ‘gaps and challenges’, a number of government and civil society representatives highlighted the catalytic role that Australia’s UN Security Council Candidacy and two-year term as a non-permanent member of the UNSC played in increased attention and activity related to advancing the WPS agenda and implementing the NAP.

## 1.3 Australian activity on WPS since 2012: a brief summary

During its term on the UNSC (2013–14), Australia played an active role in the drafting and adoption of UNSC Resolutions 2106 and 2122 (see Appendix A) and helped ensure WPS was included in the mandates for peacekeeping and political missions, such as Mali and Somalia, respectively, as well as thematic resolutions on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the role of police in peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding.

At a global level, DFAT is working with other governments, civil society and the UN to ensure that international commitments to peace and security progress the principles of Resolution 1325 and reflect the experiences, needs and roles of women and girls in conflict settings. At a country level, Australia’s aid program also provides practical support to protect women and girls in conflict and to assist women to play an active role in all stages of peace processes. DFAT is supporting UN agencies responsible for women, peace and security and protection concerns, including UN Women, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UN Population Fund, United Nations Children’s Fund and International Committee of the Red Cross.

In the Philippines, for example, DFAT has supported peacebuilding initiatives in Mindanao since 1996, including funding the Women Engaged in Action on UNSC Resolution 1325 and continues to support the peace process between the government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. DFAT has also supported the practical response to women’s reproductive health needs in many conflict settings, through the Sexual and Reproductive Health Programme in Crisis and Post Crisis Settings (SPRINT).

Defence established a high-level focal point, the Director National Action Plan for Women, Peace and Security, which sits in the office of the Chief of Defence Force and is supported by a growing network of dedicated gender advisors and other personnel who are guiding implementation and coordinating action under a Defence Implementation Plan. In addition, the Australian Civil-Military Centre has been engaged in the development of WPS training materials, including a comprehensive training package, a training documentary and educational research papers on WPS issues.

WPS training is being conducted across government for civilian, police and military personnel, including through pre-deployment training, graduate training programmes, and capacity development training. WPS is also being integrated in major multilateral military exercises. The Australian Civilian Corps employs, trains and deploys gender equality and gender-based violence specialists, including to conflict-affected countries.

The Australian Federal Police continues to integrate a gender perspective and advisory capacity in its support to policing capacity in the Pacific region, to ensure career opportunities for women and to ensure policing in the region is responsive to the needs of local women.

The Australian Government is actively involved in combating sexual and gender-based violence. The Attorney-General’s Department, in collaboration with the AFP, works regionally and bilaterally with Pacific Island law and justice agencies to build their capacity to prevent and support victims of gender-based violence, including through the development of family violence legislation. Australia is also a strong supporter of the global Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative and has continued to support research and programme work at a country and regional level through the aid programme.

Further, Australia was the first donor to earmark funding (AUD 1.5 million over two years) to the UN Women’s Women, Peace and Security Global Facility’s Global Acceleration Instrument for Women, Peace and Security and Humanitarian Action. [[2]](#footnote-2)

# 2. National Action Plans and the WPS agenda

## 2.1 National Action Plans as an important tool

In the early years following the adoption of Resolution 1325 in 2000, stakeholders and supporters of the WPS agenda recognised the need to accelerate implementation. NAPs were identified as an important tool to assist governments in the implementation of the WPS agenda domestically and overseas. They serve as a critical mechanism to turn the international normative framework into action. They were conceived to strengthen accountability on implementation.

Beginning with Denmark, Member States began developing NAPs in 2005. In 2010, marking the 10th anniversary of Resolution 1325, 11 Member States adopted NAPs (WILPF PeaceWomen n.d.). To date, 54 countries have developed NAPs (WILPF PeaceWomen n.d.; Institute for Inclusive Security n.d.).

In addition to NAPs, there are four regional action plans on WPS housed in the European Union (EU); North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); and the Pacific Islands Forum. As of September 2015, 16 countries have revised their NAPs, some of them multiple times (Miller, Pournik & Swaine 2014; Institute for Inclusive Security n.d.). Australia was the 36th country to adopt a NAP, and the third in the Asia Pacific region (after the Philippines and Nepal) (WILPF PeaceWomen n.d.).

With the right components NAPs are a critical tool for guiding implementation of the WPS agenda. According to UN Women, NAPs are beneficial in a number of ways. They can:

* increase the **visibility** of a government’s efforts on WPS (through transparent reporting)
* serve as a mechanism for **coherence and coordination** between government agencies
* improve **monitoring and evaluation** and enhance accountability
* increase **ownership and awareness**
* increase **relevance** to domestic and foreign policy making, helping domesticate the WPS resolutions (UN Women 2012, p. 10).

However, these benefits are not automatically triggered with the adoption of a NAP.

According to a major content analysis of NAPs conducted by George Washington University, compliance with the WPS agenda was initially tied to the adoption of a NAP; however, this is no longer the case (Miller, Pournik & Swaine 2014, p. 42). As experience with, and exposure to, NAPs has deepened over the past decade, there is growing attention to the gaps in implementation and the additional layers of accountability required (Miller, Pournik & Swaine 2014). As part of their public submission to the Global Study on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, the WILPF PeaceWomen programme stated ’there is a lack of political will and failure to adequately and effectively develop and implement NAPs (2015, p.19).

2.1.1 Calls for National Action Plans

There is strong policy framework that highlights the importance of developing NAPs to further the WPS agenda including:

* 2002 UN Security Council Presidential Statement: ‘encourage[d] Member States...to develop clear strategies and action plans with goals and timetables’ (UNSC 2002).
* 2004 UN Security Council Presidential Statement (UNSC 2004).
* 2005 UN Security Council Presidential Statement: ‘reiterate[d] its call to Member States to continue to implement resolution 1325 (2000), including through the development of national action plans or other national level strategies’ (UNSC 2005).
* 2009 UN Security Council Resolution 1889 (UNSC 2009b).
* 2013 UN Security Council Resolution 2122: ‘welcomed the efforts of Member States...including the development of national action plans and implementation frameworks, and encouraged Member States to continue to pursue such implementation, including through strengthening monitoring, evaluation and coordination’ (preambular paragraph) (UNSC 2013a).


## 2.2 Barriers to NAP implementation

Focused study and analysis of NAPs in recent years has identified a number of the common barriers to NAP implementation. According to UN Women’s Guidelines for National Implementation, ‘the most consistent reasons for low performance were inadequate attention to monitoring systems, failure to allocate budgets and failure to install or activate accountability mechanisms to enforce implementation' (2012, p. 20). An analysis of implementation by 27 participating states in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) region identified two fundamental reasons for lack of progress, with some overlap with UN Women: ‘lack of capacity and commitment of actors involved’ and scarce resources earmarked for WPS (Ormhaug 2014, p. 9).

Today, there is greater understanding of the basic components, minimum standards and good practices that support effective implementation of national action plans (UN Women 2012; Ormhaug 2014; Pasquinelli & Prentice 2013; Kvinna till Kvinna 2010; WILPF PeaceWomen 2013; NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security 2015).

Figure 1 illustrates the basic components that support effective implementation of NAPs.

Figure 1: What makes NAPs work



## 2.3 Actions beyond the NAP

It is important to note that, despite the value and utility of NAPs, WPS work does not start and end with NAPs. According to George Washington University authors, a NAP is ‘neither necessary for promoting gender mainstreaming, nor is it sufficient’ (Miller, Pournik & Swaine 2004, p. 4). NAPs are not the only mechanism for operationalising WPS at the national level; WPS actions can also be mainstreamed into existing gender equality action plans, the chosen approach by Colombia and Indonesia, according to UN Women (2012, p. 10). In addition, NAPs must be part of a wider, comprehensive effort. At UN Women’s Global Technical Review Meeting in 2013, there was broad consensus that ‘NAPs cannot stand alone and must be part of wider and deeper development and human rights planning processes, such as localization programs’ (UN Women 2013, p. 16).

# 3. The changing WPS landscape

## 3.1 Drivers of change

Domestically, regionally and globally the women, peace and security field is constantly expanding and changing, characterised by new and emerging issues and trends, new policy, new data, and new actors and stakeholders. In adopting the NAP, the Australian Government recognised the reality of the constantly changing WPS landscape: ‘[o]ver time, key areas of focus may change and some of the more complex issues in relation to Women, Peace and Security may be explored in greater detail in future National Action Plans’ (2012, p. 15). In the context of this changing WPS landscape, the NAP is understood to be a ‘living document…’ (Australian Government 2012, p. 15). Acknowledgement of the ever-changing WPS landscape is also reflected in the decision to conduct an interim review of the NAP (see Appendix D).

There are a number of key drivers of this changing landscape for WPS, within and outside of the UNSC. These include:

* an expanding normative framework on WPS
* increased global attention to preventing and responding to sexual violence in conflict
* increased linkages between the WPS agenda and other thematic areas of the UNSC and the multilateral system.

The latter includes the Sustainable Development Goals, the Beijing Platform for Action and the World Humanitarian Summit. A number of the global policy linkages, which are providing context for and are informing the WPS agenda are illustrated in Figure 2.

New and emerging issues for the WPS agenda, including the connections between gender, counter terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), also provide important context for this interim review. Four of these emerging issues that are having an impact on the WPS agenda globally, and the implementation of NAPs nationally and regionally are illustrated in Figure 3.

This ever-evolving WPS agenda and the global peace and security landscape more generally represent significant challenges for UN Member States. This is reflected in the shifting focus in the approach of other non-conflict donor countries to the WPS agenda and to the revision of their NAPs (see Appendix G for some examples). The Australian NAP will have the opportunity to learn from the revision processes of other, especially non-conflict donor, countries in the development of its post-2018 NAP to ensure its relevance and currency.

3.1.1 Major global advances in the WPS policy arena since the launch of Australian NAP

* United Kingdom’s Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative (PSVI) (2012) and launch of the International Protocol on the Investigation and Documentation of Sexual Violence in Conflict at the Global Summit to end Sexual Violence in Conflict (2014).
* Adoption of UNSC Resolution 2106 (2013), setting out a framework to address sexual violence in conflict, including impunity for perpetrators.
* G8 Declaration on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict (2013).
* Adoption of UNSC Resolution 2122 (2013) representing a shift toward greater policy focus on participation of women.
* Global Study and High Level Review on Women, Peace and Security (2015), called for by UNSC Resolution 2122 (2013).
* Establishment of the Women, Peace and Security Financing Discussion Group and Women, Peace and Security Global Acceleration Instrument (2014).
* Adoption by the Committee on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) of General Recommendation No. 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict situations (2013).
* Adoption by the UN General Assembly of the Arms Trade Treaty (2013).
* Regional implementation plans (EU, NATO 2014), Pacific RAP (2012).
* NATO military guidelines on the prevention and response to sexual violence in conflicts (2015).

## 3.2 Global Study and High Level Review on WPS: ‘Seizing the opportunity that 2015 presents’

The 15th anniversary of Resolution 1325 in October 2015 has been marked by a UN Secretary-General–commissioned Global Study on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security (Global Study) and a High-Level Review. The Global Study highlights good practice examples, implementation gaps and challenges, emerging trends and priorities for action (Coomoraswamy 2015). The Global Study was released prior to the High Level Review in October 2015. The Australian Government made a submission to the Global Study (Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 2015) and has repeatedly emphasised the importance of these processes to help set the WPS Agenda in 2015 and beyond. Australian, regional and international civil society organisations and women’s rights advocates have been actively engaged in, and contributed to, the Global Study through a civil society survey, global and regional consultations and through submitting recommendations.

Parallel to the Global Study and High Level Review are two other UN system reviews being undertaken in 2015 in the peace and security field – the Review of Peace Support Operations and the ten-year Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture.[[3]](#footnote-3) The integration of the WPS agenda within these two review processes and reports is a critical test of how well the UN system is mainstreaming gender concerns across all matters of peace and security (Goetz & Jenkins 2015). The Australian Government, through its submission to the Global Study and in recent speeches, has highlighted the importance of effective integration of WPS across the three UN system reviews in setting the direction for the WPS agenda.

The outcome of these three reviews will provide further critical guidance for determining the ongoing direction and relevance of the Australian NAP.

## 3.3 Expansion of the normative framework on Women, Peace and Security

Since 2012, when the Australian NAP was launched, the Women, Peace and Security agenda has expanded. This includes new UNSC Resolutions (see Appendix A), an expanded scope of work on preventing and responding to sexual violence in conflict and CEDAW General Recommendation 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict situations.

3.3.1 New UN Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security

In recognition of growing global complexity around countering violent extremism and terrorism, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 2242 (UNSCR 2242) to improve implementation of landmark text on Women, Peace, Security Agenda on 13 October 2015. The UNSC outlined actions to improve implementation of its landmark Women, Peace and Security Agenda, covering its work on countering violent extremism and terrorism, improving working methods and broadly taking up the recommendations of the UN Global Study. The Resolution calls on Member States to increase resourcing for Women, Peace and Security. The Secretary-General was urged to initiate a revised strategy with the goal of doubling the number of women in peacekeeping operations over the next five years. Women, peace and security concerns will be integrated across all country-specific situations on the UNSC agenda. More broadly, the UNSC urged the Secretary-General and UN bodies to better integrate gender perspectives into their work so as to address accountability deficits, including through the addition of gender targets as an indicator of individual performance in all compacts with senior managers at Headquarters and in the field.[[4]](#footnote-4) This most recent resolution aims to strengthen the implementation of and outcomes for the UN Women, Peace and Security Agenda by harnessing more resourcing from Member States and focusing on better integration of the Agenda in all aspects of UN business.

In July 2013, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2106, the fourth WPS resolution to focus on conflict-related sexual violence. It sets out the framework for the UN’s work to address sexual violence in conflict, and to combat impunity for perpetrators of such violence. It adds greater operational detail and reiterates that all actors, including all Member States, must do more to implement previous mandates and combat impunity for these crimes. This Resolution also makes connections to other parts of the international system, including the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the work of the International Criminal Court on addressing impunity for sexual violence crimes (Harris-Rimmer 2014; International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect 2015).[[5]](#footnote-5)

The adoption of Resolution 2122 in October 2013 was identified as a particularly significant addition to the participation dimensions of the WPS agenda. For instance, the 1325 Network Finland described the resolution as bringing Resolution 1325 ‘into the contemporary decade’ (Jukarainen & Puumala 2014, p. 6). Resolution 2122 sets out the UN’s concrete commitment to improving women’s participation in conflict prevention and resolution efforts, and in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. The Resolution also looks beyond sexual and gender-based violence to address a holistic scope of violations and abuses of women’s rights. Further, it introduces reproductive health into the WPS agenda.

The Australian Government has also hailed Resolution 2122 as a significant step forward. According to the 2014 Progress Report on the Australian NAP, Resolution 2122 ‘makes some unprecedented advances’ and is significant for ‘putting in place a roadmap for a more systematic approach to implementation of WPS commitments’ (Australian Government 2014, p. 65). In practical terms, what these advances mean for the WPS agenda and the NAP in Australia are yet to be seen. Along with an anticipated new Resolution on WPS being developed in advance of the High Level Review and Open Debate on WPS in October 2015, these new Resolutions have wide ranging implications for the NAP as the framework for implementing the WPS agenda.

3.3.2 Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict and the Protection–Participation ‘tug-of-war’

The normative framework around the prevention and response to sexual violence in conflict has grown considerably in the last few years. It began with the quick succession of Security Council resolutions 1820 and 1888 on conflict-related sexual violence in 2008 and 2009 respectively (which Australia co-sponsored), and was particularly spurred by the launch of the Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative (2012), Resolution 2106 (2013) and the Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict (2014). Australia is a supporter of the Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI) with the Foreign Minister a champion of this initiative. Prior to the Global Summit, the Australian Government held the Australian Dialogue on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict at Parliament House in 2014, resulting in an Outcomes Statement (DFAT 2014), which the government took to the Global Summit. At the Global Summit, Australia endorsed the International Protocol on the Documentation and Investigation of Sexual Violence in Conflict; and the government has identified the need to integrate the International Protocol into domestic legislation (Bird 2015b).

There has been considerable concern among many in the global WPS community about the disproportionate focus on the protection aspects of the WPS agenda at the expense of progress on the participation aspects of the broader WPS agenda – those aspects addressing women’s participation and agency beyond their victimhood (DPMC 2015). Concern has also been raised about the predominant protection focus on sexual violence. Civil society submissions to the Global Study and the global Civil Society Roadmap on WPS have called for a more inclusive understanding of protection needs beyond sexual violence to encompass all human rights abuses in conflict and post-conflict settings (NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security 2015; WILPF PeaceWomen 2015; Harris-Rimmer 2014).

In the Australian context, the protection–participation ‘tug-of-war’ is a familiar tension. One key message from Australian civil society organisations responding to the first consultation draft of the NAP noted ‘while we commend the strong focus on violence against women in conflict situations there is less attention given to women’s participation in prevention, peacebuilding and leadership roles’ (UN Women Australia 2011, p. 1). These issues have again been raised in an Australian civil society submission to the Global Study (WILPF Australia 2015) and in interviews with civil society advocates as part of this interim review. The Australian Government has noted this issue and has more recently been articulating the importance of women’s participation as central to all peace and security efforts, in particular to conflict prevention (Stott-Despoja 2015b).

Other countries with NAPs, particularly non-conflict donor countries, have been recognising and addressing these issues through their NAP revisions. For instance, the first Danish NAP (2005–08), was primarily focused on the protection of women (Denmark Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense & Danish National Police 2008, p. 11). Two subsequent revisions have reflected the lesson that ‘deliberate and sustained attention is required to ensure that the totality of Denmark’s actions on SCR 1325 reflects a balanced approach between protection of women and girls, and promoting the right of women to participate in peace and security work (Denmark Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense & Danish National Police 2008, p. 11). As Australia continues through the monitoring processes of the current NAP and of NAP revision, lessons from other countries will be an essential source of good practice to strengthen the NAP and implementation of the WPS agenda.

3.3.3 CEDAW General Recommendation No. 30

In 2013, the Committee on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted General Recommendation No. 30 (GR 30) on women in conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict situations. This has been seen as a ‘progressive move towards holding state parties to account on their implementation of the WPS agenda through the CEDAW reporting processes’ (UN Women 2013, p. 10). In practical terms, this has extended the accountability of Member States, including Australia on WPS issues.

Recent work has analysed the connections of the WPS agenda and GR 30 (UN Women 2015); and academic analysis has considered the interconnections between the WPS Agenda, GR 30 and R2P doctrine (Harris-Rimmer 2014). The importance of GR 30 has been noted in Australian Government publications (DFAT 2015) and highlighted by the Australian Ambassador for Women and Girls in her speech to the WILPF centenary conference in May 2015 in Canberra (Stott-Despoja 2015b). This development has implications for the relevance and implementation of the NAP, in particular relating to issues of governance and accountability. In practice, it is not yet clear how GR 30 – and the accountability measures that this contains – will be implemented as part of current and future NAP implementation and revision.

3.3.4 WPS and implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty

In April 2013, UN Member States adopted the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), the first treaty that recognises the link between gender-based violence and the international arms trade. Australia strongly encouraged ratification of the ATT and noted at the time ‘we look forward to the contribution that implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty can make to reducing gender-based violence in conflict settings’ (Quinlan 2013). Civil society organisations are increasingly making connections between WPS, the ATT and broader issues of disarmament and armed violence reduction (WILPF PeaceWomen 2015), including in a number of interviews with civil society during this review.

While the linkages between gender-based violence and the arms trade are not directly addressed in the NAP, the Australian Government has been making connections between these issues as part of their WPS work in international fora. As noted by Australia’s Ambassador for Women and Girls in March 2015, ‘strengthening links between the arms control and women, peace and security agendas was a key feature of Australia’s work during our term on the UN Security Council from 2013–14’ (Stott-Despoja 2015a). Further, she noted that ‘connecting these agendas also provides an opportunity to address harmful gender norms which sustain the use of weapons, gun cultures and militant masculinities linked to the perpetuation of violence, including gender based violence’ (Stott-Despoja 2015a).

Following the adoption of the ATT, Australia supported the integration of gender-related text into Resolution 2117 on Small Arms and Light Weapons, the first ever SCR dedicated to addressing small arms and light weapons. It recognises the impact of small arms and light weapons on civilians, particularly women and children, and emphasises the importance of women’s participation in combating the illicit transfer, accumulation and misuse of small arms. As the relevance of the NAP is assessed, the response to this expanding normative WPS framework will also need to be taken into consideration.

## 3.4 Policy coherence across the UN system

Along with the expansion of the WPS agenda, the effective integration of gender perspectives into other policy frameworks relating to peace and security across the UN and multilateral system is another important consideration for the NAP and Australian engagement on the WPS agenda internationally. In 2015, there are a number of ongoing policy processes with relevance to the WPS agenda, in particular the Post-2015 Framework development agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals; the 20-year Review of the Beijing Platform for Action; and the World Humanitarian Summit.

3.4.1 Post-2015 Development Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals

The post-2015 development agenda is the successor to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which expire in 2015. The UN, Member States and civil society have advocated for integration of gender, peace and security issues in the Post-2015 Framework and in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and appropriate targets and indicators, including during the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) and the 20-year Review of the Beijing Platform for Action (Wright 2013; Conciliation Resources 2014; UN Women 2013). Australia’s national report on the implementation of the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of its adoption, highlighted the NAP as one of the five major achievements for gender equality, in the five-year reporting period from 2009–2013 (DPMC 2014a).

The Australian Government has continually advocated for a stand-alone goal on gender equality in the SDGs (DPMC 2014b). Further, the government has been ‘advocating for a comprehensive approach to gender equality and women’s empowerment in the post-2015 framework, including to: end violence against women; ensure the economic empowerment of women; and ensure women’s leadership and participation at all levels in the public and private sectors’ (Stott-Despoja 2015b). The SDGs were adopted in September 2015 and include Goal 5 (achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls) and Goal 16 (promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels) (UN n.d.). As the Australian Foreign Minister highlighted in Australia’s national statement to the UN General Assembly on 29 September:

Notably, Australia’s commitment statement at the Global Leaders’ Meeting on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment (27 September 2015) did not reference the WPS agenda (Stott Despoja 2015b, c). The adoption of the post-2015 agenda and the SDGs, how effectively the government integrates gender, peace and security issues into its approach to the newly adopted SDGs, will establish important context for framing Australia’s future implementation of the WPS agenda and the Australian NAP.

3.4.2 World Humanitarian Summit

The World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) in 2016 is another important process that is drawing on and expanding the WPS agenda – with particular relevance to the ‘relief and recovery pillar’ of the WPS agenda and Australian NAP.[[6]](#footnote-6)

The WHS aims to reform the humanitarian system so it can adapt to future crises and better assist and protect people today. Through regional and global consultations for the WHS and the Global Study, there has been increasing attention to the linkages between the two areas. This in particular has drawn attention to the ongoing humanitarian and development divide within the humanitarian system and within development agencies; and greater attention to the WPS agenda as it relates to natural disasters, complex emergencies and protracted crises. These issues were the focus of a global consultation for the Global Study in the Hague in 2015, the subject of a CARE International Policy Brief (CARE International 2015), were part of the Pacific Regional WHS consultation discussions in 2015, and were a focus of the UNSC Open Debate on WPS in 2014 on Displaced Women and Girls, including the Australian statement:

Figure 2: Current global policy linkages with the WPS agenda



## 3.5 New and emerging issues

3.5.1 WPS and women’s role in countering violent extremism and acts of terror

The role of women in propagating and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), and the specific impacts of violent extremism, is an understudied but critical security issue which directly relates to the implementation of the WPS agenda (Huckerby 2015). Research and experience demonstrate that women can enable, support, benefit from, be victims of, counteract and prevent violent extremism. There is a growing body of literature, policy analysis and practical work being undertaken to draw the connections between the WPS agenda and the responses of the UNSC and the multilateral system to the threat of violent extremism and terrorism.

UNSC Resolution 2122 first introduced terrorism to the WPS agenda through preambular language. Since then, there has been increasing global attention to the connections between CVE and terrorism and the WPS agenda, with particular reference to Boko Haram and Islamic State (IS). In September 2014, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2178, which focuses on the emerging threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters and calls for the need to empower women as a prevention response to the spread of violent extremism (UNSC 2014a). Further, during the 2014 Security Council Open Debate on WPS, a Presidential Statement was issued which reiterated the role of women’s participation and empowerment as a buffer to the spread of extremism while also noting the specific consequences of violent extremism on the rights of women and girls (UNSC 2014b).

Australia’s submission to the Global Study noted CVE as an emerging issue for the WPS agenda (DPMC 2015). The Australian Government has participated in UN roundtables on the topic of Gender and CVE and highlighted the role women play in preventing and combating violent extremism and radicalisation in Australia in the UN General Assembly (Bird 2015a). At the 59th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women in March 2015, Australia’s Country Statement also noted that ‘violent extremism appears to be increasingly targeting women and girls’ (Cash 2015). Further, the Australian Foreign Minister, in her address to the Regional Summit to Counter Violent Extremism, focused the address on ‘the role of women and families in challenging terrorist propaganda’ (Bishop 2015). The topic of rising cultural and religious fundamentalisms and the connections to the WPS agenda was also raised in the Asia Pacific Regional Consultations for the Global Study.[[7]](#footnote-7) As noted by one government and one civil society interviewee for this review, this is also encouraging further discussion around issues currently not addressed in the NAP, such as female combatants. These issues will continue to play a dominant role at both a domestic and international level with relevance for the WPS agenda and the Australian NAP.

3.5.2 Role of men and boys in addressing gender inequalities in conflict and post-conflict settings

The role of men and boys and addressing concepts of masculinity in addressing gender inequality in conflict and post-conflict settings are receiving increasing international attention. Numerous organisations and initiatives are now dedicated to engaging men on issues of women’s rights, gender equality and violence against women in conflict and non-conflict situations. WILPF PeaceWomen’s Summary Report of public submissions on WPS highlights the increasing attention to the role of men and boys in preventing gender-based violence; challenging dominant forms of masculinity in perpetuating cycles of violence; and gender-based violence committed against boys and men in conflict settings (WILPF PeaceWomen 2015). As Hannah Wright from Saferworld has noted: ‘working on masculinities means far more than understanding men’s vulnerabilities. It means challenging the links between masculinity, power and violence which drive conflict as well as the oppression of women and sexual and gender minorities’ (Wright 2015).

There is also a gradually increasing awareness of the intersections between the WPS agenda and sexual and minority rights (Hagen 2014; Wright 2015). The issues of sexual orientation and gender identities in conflict – and the increased risks of violence – were also highlighted in civil society submissions to the Global Study (WILPF PeaceWomen 2015, p. 39).

Some countries implementing NAPs have been responding to these issues in their NAP revisions. For instance, the most recent UK NAP (2014–17) highlights the role of men and boys in promoting the WPS agenda and has identified ‘work with men and boys’ as a guiding principle for the UK’s Strategic Framework on Women, Peace and Security (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2014a, p. 2).

The Australian NAP does not specifically address the role of men and boys in preventing and responding to violence against women in conflict settings, in addressing gender inequality or issues of masculinity as they relate to the WPS agenda. As such, this growing field of analysis and practice will be an important area to consider as Australia’s engagement with the WPS agenda continues and for consideration in the Final Review.


3.5.3 The intersections of climate change and environmental insecurity and the WPS agenda

The linkages between WPS and climate change and environmental insecurity are also receiving increasing attention. This is a particularly relevant issue for the Asia Pacific region, the most natural disaster-prone region in the world (UN ESCAP 2014).

Climate change and environmental insecurity were also raised in the context of gender inequality and the role of women in addressing these issues, at the Asia-Pacific Regional Consultations for the Global Study.[[8]](#footnote-8)

Internationally, countries are addressing these issues in a variety of ways in connection to the WPS Agenda. For instance, both of Finland’s NAPs (2008–11 and 2012–16) consider climate change as relevant to the WPS agenda. Finland’s second NAP includes an explicit objective about supporting ‘women’s participation in the mitigation of climate change and adaptation to its consequences’ (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2012, p. 22). These interrelated issues are another growing area of connection to the WPS agenda that will be important to consider in assessing the relevance of Australian engagement on WPS in the Asia Pacific region and for the Australian NAP.

Figure 3: New and emerging issues related to the WPS agenda



# 4. Key findings and recommendations

This section outlines the **16 key findings and corresponding recommendations** emerging from the interim review process.

The findings are structured around the five review themes:

1) relevance of current Australian NAP actions

2) monitoring and evaluating the NAP

3) implementing the NAP actions: gaps and challenges[[9]](#footnote-9)

4) opportunities for collaboration between government and civil society

5) laying the groundwork for the final review in 2018

Many of the findings will be familiar to WPS stakeholders because they align with those raised in recent years as part of national and global discussions and analyses (WILPF Australia 2009a, b; WILPF PeaceWomen 2015; UN Women 2013).

## 4.1 Relevance of current Australian NAP actions (theme 1)

**Finding 1:** The actions in the Australian NAP are relevant for implementing the WPS agenda because they align with the actions that Member States are encouraged to adopt in the eight WPS UNSC Resolutions.[[10]](#footnote-10)

4.1.1 Alignment of the Australian NAP actions to WPS Resolutions

Consistency between Australian NAP actions and the actions that Member States are encouraged to adopt within WPS resolutions provides the strongest evidence that actions in the Australian NAP are well suited to implement the WPS agenda. According to Australian WPS scholar Kate Lee-Koo, ‘the language of the NAP reflects the intent of UNSC Resolution 1325’s architects’ (2014, p. 305).

Table 1 illustrates through six examples that the actions adopted in the Australian NAP align with the WPS resolutions.

Table 1: Evidence of consistency between Australian NAP and WPS resolutions

| Australian NAP actions | Operative paragraphs of WPS resolutions |
| --- | --- |
| 2.1 Assess and further build on training programs for Australian defence, police and civilian personnel to enhance staff competence and understanding of Women, Peace and Security. | S/RES/1960: 15. Encourages Member States to deploy greater numbers of female military and police personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and to provide all military and police personnel with adequate training on sexual and gender-based violence, inter alia, to carry out their responsibilities [almost identical language to S/RES/1888, overlaps also with language in S/RES/1820] [UNSC 2010; 2009a; 2008). |
| 2.2 Ensure women have opportunities to participate in the AFP, Defence and ADF and in deployments overseas, including in decision-making positions. | S/RES/1325: 1. Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict (UNSC 2000). |
| 3.2 Support Australian and international civil society organisations to promote the roles and address the needs of women in the prevention, management and resolution of conflict. | S/RES/2122: 7(b). Encourages concerned Member States to develop dedicated funding mechanisms to support the work and enhance capacities of organizations that support women’s leadership development and full participation in all levels of decision-making, regarding the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000, inter alia through increasing contributions to local civil society (UNSC 2013a). |
| 4.1 Support capacity building for women in fragile, conflict and/or post conflict settings through promoting opportunities for women’s leadership and participation in decision-making at a country-level. | S/RES/1888: 16. Urges the Secretary General, Member States and the heads of regional organizations to take measures to increase the representation of women in mediation processes and decision-making processes with regard to conflict resolution and peacebuilding (UNSC 2009a). |
| 4.3 Support humanitarian action that responds to gender-based violence in crisis situations, with particular regard to health. | S/RES/2106: 19. Recognizing the importance of providing timely assistance to survivors of sexual violence, urges United Nations entities and donors to provide non-discriminatory and comprehensive health services, including sexual and reproductive health, psychosocial, legal, and livelihood support and other multi-sectoral services for survivors of sexual violence, taking into account the specific needs of persons with disabilities…(UNSC 2013b). |
| 4.5 Ensure peace processes in which Australia plays a prominent role promote the meaningful participation of women, and consider local women’s needs, rights and capacity. | S/RES/1889: 1. Urges Member States, international and regional organizations to take further measures to improve women’s participation during all stages of peace processes, particularly in conflict resolution, post-conflict planning and peacebuilding, including by enhancing their engagement in political and economic decision-making at early stages of recovery processes, through inter alia promoting women’s leadership and capacity to engage in aid management and planning, supporting women’s organizations, and countering negative societal attitudes about women’s capacity to participate equally (UNSC 2009b). |

Sources: Australian Government 2012; UNSC 2013a, 2013b, 2010, 2009a, 2009b, 2008, 2000.

**Finding 2**: The actions in the Australian NAP are relevant for implementing the WPS agenda because they are broad, and thereby offer flexibility to shape activities and respond to changes in the WPS landscape.

4.1.2 Agencies can implement activities that align with their strengths   
and priorities

The WPS agenda, and the eight UNSC Resolutions that underpin this agenda, cover an extensive range of issues to advance women’s participation and protection. Some issues are broad – such as strengthening women’s leadership and political and economic empowerment, while others are more detailed and specific – such as accountability for perpetrators of sexual violence in conflict (see Appendix A).

The Australian NAP adopts a broad approach to implementing the WPS agenda. Out of a total of 24 actions, 22 are broad. The remaining two actions contain much greater specificity: Action 1.2 is to develop guidelines for the Protection of Civilians (PoC) and Action 3.3 is to invite Australian Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) to meet with the WPS IDWG once a year (Australian Government, 2012).

The advantage of adopting a broad approach is the **flexibility it brings to implementation**. Researchers at George Washington University suggest that adopting a broad approach to NAPs is good practice, due to the flexibility that is created. Their analysis, based on a literature review and content analysis of a range of NAPs concludes that 'in some cases, flexibility rather than specificity may be more conducive to implementation and long-term success' (Miller, Pournik & Swaine 2014, p. 32).

Agencies interviewed for this review find the breadth of actions contained in the Australian NAP allows them to contribute to the WPS agenda by implementing actions that align with individual agency strengths and priorities. The majority of civil society actors concur, citing the actions can be interpreted and operationalised in a way that makes them responsive to context. The Australian NAP is considered by some to be a ‘good guide’ – with plenty of scope to design and implement actions that meet the duel purposes of agency strategy and the WPS agenda.

Table 2 illustrates how actions in the Australian NAP offer flexibility to address a wide range of elements within the WPS agenda.

Table 2: Evidence of flexibility in NAP actions

| Australian NAP actions | Breadth of activities encompassed |
| --- | --- |
| 2.1 Assess and further build on training programs for Australian defence, police and civilian personnel to enhance staff competence and understanding of [WPS]. | - All pre-deployment training, including for Defence, AFP and ACC.  - WPS training as part of broad spectrum of training and capacity development for all civilian and military government personnel.  - Military and civil-military national, regional and multilateral exercises (e.g. Talisman Sabre). |
| 3.2 Support Australian and international civil society organisations to promote the roles and address the needs of women in the prevention, management and resolution of conflict | - New element of WPS agenda: action to address role and experience of women in preventing and countering violent extremism (see Section 3). |
| 4.3 Support humanitarian action that responds to gender-based violence in crisis situations, with particular regard to health. | - Action related to the International Protocol on the Documentation and Investigation of Sexual Violence in Conflict.  - Action related to the US-led Call to Action on Gender Based Violence in Emergencies.  - The role of men and boys in relation to countering gender-based violence.  - New element of WPS agenda: sexual and reproductive health of women affected by conflict (see Section 3). |

The usefulness of adopting a flexible approach is highlighted through the linkage between the Australian NAP and the Australian Defence Implementation Plan (DIP) (see Theme 3). The DIP builds on the broad language under Action 2.1 (quoted in Table 2 above) about ‘[building] on training programs’ to encompass more specific, tailored action on ‘[incorporating] WPS and gender perspective into planning and conduct of joint [military] exercises’ (Department of Defence n.d.).

4.1.3 Agencies can respond to changes in the WPS landscape

The WPS landscape is not static, and it varies between contexts. Different issues rise to prominence at different times, and new and emerging issues enter the landscape. A broad, flexible approach allows agencies to respond to these dynamics, adjusting activity-level implementation to maintain relevance and responsiveness.

The second Dutch NAP (2012–15) provides a clear example of, and strong case for, greater flexibility in relation to the changing WPS landscape. According to a civil society analysis of the Dutch NAP, the revision ‘puts a premium on flexibility and the ability to respond to changing circumstances’ (Meijenfeldt et al. 2013, p. 43). A detailed action plan is intentionally omitted from the revision (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2012, p. 8). By way of explanation, the Dutch NAP signatories explain: ‘when dealing with turbulent and rapidly changing environments, an obligation to comply with detailed action plans for the next four years can be restrictive. We want to have the possibility and scope to respond quickly to new developments worldwide and to make use of suddenly opening windows of opporunities0 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2012 p.8).

According to the WPS Coordinator in the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interviewed for this interim review, a shift toward greater flexibility has been ‘positive’ and has enabled ‘more flexibility in terms of activities and countries we work in’.[[11]](#footnote-11)

During interviews for this review, agencies and civil society stakeholders consistently raised the need for continuing flexibility and responsiveness within the Australian NAP. For example Defence staff regularly assess whether and how emerging issues align with the WPS agenda and then incorporate new activities into the DIP, where relevant and appropriate. This approach reflects Defence’s view of the DIP as a ‘fluid and live matrix of activities’ (Wittwer 2015, p. 360).

The success of Defence’s DIP in advancing the WPS agenda within Australia acts as a counterpoint to the Netherlands’ intentional omission of a DIP due to concerns it may restrict flexibility. However the desire for flexibility to be built into implementation and the need for detailed plans are not necessarily in conflict – what is important is that implementers have a clear understanding of how to implement the actions, and the ability to take management decisions in response to changing circumstances.

**Finding 3:** The broad, flexible approach that Australia has adopted is consistent with approaches adopted by other Member States.

4.1.4 Consistency between the Australian NAP and approaches adopted by other Member States

The relevance of current Australian NAP actions is further underlined by the consistency between Australia’s approach, and the approach adopted by other Member States in defining their own NAP actions. Australia’s broad approach in its NAP language is similar to that found in the NAPs of a number of other non-conflict affected donor countries. A comparative evaluation of Nordic implementation of Resolution 1325 found a broad approach used by all the NAPs they reviewed and described this approach as reflecting ‘the wordings of the UNSCR 1325 itself’ (Jukarainen & Puumala 2014, p. 24). According to their evaluation, this approach ‘leaves concrete measures and actions rather open and to be decided by the actors who do the actual implementation of the NAP’ (Jukarainen & Puumala 2014, p. 24).

This analysis is echoed in the 2013 independent mid-term progress report of Ireland’s NAP (2011-2014), which encouraged the next NAP to have strategic objectives 'supported by fewer but broader actions and indicators to strengthen the overall coherence of the framework and enable the widest range of possible contributions from relevant agencies' (Hinds & McMiinn 2013, p. 38).

Consistency in approach does not mean that all NAPs are alike. Member States interpret WPS resolutions differently based on their national perspective, capabilities, resources, circumstances, history, political dynamics, and experience, including in relation to past and ongoing conflict or instability. Accordingly, governments prioritise and implement different actions. No two NAPs are the same; nor should they be.

4.1.5 Recommendations

| Key finding | Corresponding recommendations for the Australian Government |
| --- | --- |
| 1 | Maintain a broad approach to actions with the Australian NAP, allowing agencies to build activities that advance the WPS agenda and align with individual agency strengths and priorities. |
| 2 | Build assessment of new and emerging issues into the Australian NAP to encourage agencies to consider new developments and approaches to further advance the WPS agenda.  Maintain flexibility to adjust activities according to changes in context – while still contributing to the Australian NAP actions and broader WPS agenda. |
| 3 | Monitor NAP reviews and evaluations by other Member States and feed learning into Australia’s implementation. |

## 4.2 Monitoring and evaluating the Australian NAP (theme 2)

**Finding 4:** The measures contained in the Australian NAP M&E framework are not sufficient to track progress because the measures do not cover the full spectrum of actions being implemented.

4.2.1 Why is monitoring and evaluation (M&E) important?

Adoption of a NAP is no longer considered sufficient accountability for implementing the WPS agenda. Rather, Member States are expected to measure and demonstrate what the NAP has achieved (Miller, Pournik & Swaine 2014, p. 46). The UN Secretary-General’s 2011 report on WPS called for the adoption of indicators in NAPs to effectively monitor and evaluate progress and impact (UN Security Council, S/2011/598, 2011, cited by Miller, Pournik & Swaine 2014, p. 46). M&E is a ‘helpful tool for showing results. With the right resources, it makes it easier to answer the growing number of people who ask, “what differences have we made?”’ (Institute of Inclusive Security 2014, p.12).

The Australian NAP aims to change the government’s ‘approach to peace and security efforts’ (Australian Government 2012, p. 15). Further, the M&E measures are intended to be ‘high-level measures to track the progress of the NAP’ (Australian Government 2012, p. 20).

However, analysis of the Australian NAP’s M&E framework indicates that the current indicators[[12]](#footnote-12) are unable to measure change and thus need to be **significantly strengthened** in order to track the progress and effectiveness of the NAP[[13]](#footnote-13).

Beyond the specific M&E measures themselves, some of the key requirements for a robust, accountable M&E framework, identified by expert WPS bodies such as UN Women and the Institute for Inclusive Security, are not included in the Australian NAP (UN Women 2012; Inclusive Security 2014). Key M&E requirements often cited are:


* clear objectives, benchmarks, responsibilities, dedicated budget allocation aligned with responsibilities
* timelines (WILPF Australia 2009; UN Women 2012; WILPF PeaceWomen 2015; Coomoraswamy 2015).

In addition, SMART indicators – specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound – are a widely accepted good practice (Hudson 2013; Woroniuk 2014; UN Women 2012; WILPF 2013). The current M&E framework does align indicators to agencies responsible; however, it **does not identify clear objectives or a goal, timeframes or budgetary allocation** (see theme 3 in Section 4.3 for analysis of budgetary allocation).

4.2.2 Overview of the Australian NAP M&E framework

The Australian NAP M&E framework is described within the NAP as a ‘suite of high level measures to track the progress of the NAP’ (Australian Government 2012, p. 21). As the diagram contained within the Australian NAP shown in Figure 5 illustrates, the measures contained within the NAP are designed to assess the effectiveness of each strategy, rather than each action.

Figure 4: The relationship between thematic areas, strategies, actions and measures



Source: Australian Government 2012, p. 20

The M&E framework contains 16 measures, outlined in Appendix C. The interim review assessed the measures for their ability to indicate progress and effectiveness of the Australian NAP. Before doing so, however, the general requirements for a robust M&E framework are discussed.

4.2.3 M&E frameworks globally

The challenges of the Australian NAP’s current M&E framework as a whole examined in this section are not unique. Globally, M&E frameworks have been a consistent source of weakness in implementation at the national level (UN Women 2012). According to George Washington University, financial allocation and timeframes, key M&E requirements, are missing from most NAPs (Miller, Pournik & Swaine 2014). The WILPF PeaceWomen programme’s 2015 ‘Report on the Public Submissions to the Global Study on the Women, Peace and Security Agenda’ identifies the lack of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms as a continuing global concern (WILPF PeaceWomen 2015, p. 19).

However, among countries with NAPs, there is growing understanding and appreciation for the central role played by M&E frameworks in effective implementation of the WPS agenda. The George Washington University global analysis of NAPs found that ‘…NAPs that adopt stringent monitoring and evaluation frameworks have become the standard-bearer for NAPs that are effective in purpose and accountable in terms of measurement (Miller, Pournik & Swaine 2014, p. 46). The American researchers also identified a clear trend toward strengthened M&E systems among revised NAPs, including greater specificity in language and budgetary allocation (Miller, Pournik & Swaine 2014, p. 3; Ormhaug 2014) (see Appendix G).

**Finding 5:** The absence of an overarching goal and specific targets within the Australian NAP M&E framework restrict the ability to measure progress.

4.2.4 Weakness of the current M&E measures in the Australian NAP

In examining the current M&E framework of the Australian NAP, this analysis looks at:

* the measures themselves
* the associated challenge of measuring and attributing impact
* the absence of an explicit overarching goal and objectives
* the implications of the current M&E measures for government reporting.

The section closes with a brief examination of the utility of department-specific implementation plans for monitoring and evaluation.

The interim review identified **two main weaknesses** of the current measures themselves in the M&E framework.

First, the 16 measures in the framework are not aligned against the Australian actions; rather they are aligned against the five strategies. As a result, some actions are not linked to an indicator and thus are not being measured.

Second, the indicators themselves do not measure change; they are quantitative, relating to numbers (of documents, personnel, cases, interventions) and descriptions (of activities, approaches, assistance, strategies, initiatives and interventions).[[14]](#footnote-14) In contrast, the UK’s Implementation Plan, which accompanies the 2014–17 UK NAP, incorporates indicators ‘to give readers a sense of ambition and direction’ (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2014, p. 3).

Based on comments made during interviews, among government interviewees, some recognised the need to strengthen the framework (while many were unfamiliar with the framework). More than one government interviewee described the framework as ‘insufficient’. The majority of civil society interviewees consider the M&E framework inadequate for holding government accountable to the Australian NAP.

Table 3 illustrates, through three examples, the limitations of the current measures, in particular their **inability to qualitatively assess the actions** in the Australian NAP. Table 3 also illustrates the implications of the existing measures for government reporting, which is examined later in this section.

Table 3: Evidence of limitations of current M&E measures

|  | **Example 1** | **Example 2** | **Example 3** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Sample Australian NAP Action | 2.1 Assess and further build on training programs for Australian defence, police and civilian personnel to enhance staff competence and understanding of [WPS]. | 4.2 Ensure that Australia’s humanitarian assistance and recovery programs in conflict and post-conflict situations respect applicable international human rights and refugee law in regards to women and girls, and can be accessed by and benefit diverse groups of vulnerable women and girls. | 4.8 Support women experts, special envoys, commanders and high-ranking officials to promote a high level consideration of gender issues in fragile, conflict and/or post- conflict settings. |
| Associated M&E measure | Strategy 2 – Measure 2a: Number and percentage of Australian military, police and civilian personnel deployed in operations that have received training on [WPS] (including their responsibilities under UNSCR 1325, 1820, 1888, 1889 and 1960), and a description of that training. | No associated measure. | Can be linked to Strategy 4 – Measure 4g. List of Australian women and men in senior UN decision-making positions relating to peace and security. |
| What’s missing in M&E measure | - Explicitly focuses on training related to deployment, not broader spectrum of WPS training addressed in Action 2.1, including training of government personnel more generally, and training of government personnel in overseas positions that are not operations  - Does not capture the quality of the training, the qualification of the trainer, the impact on understanding among those trained, or the impact and contribution of that training on the ground (on deployment) (Steering Committee of the Annual Civil Society Dialogue 2014) | - No clear measure therefore no way to adequately measure the action. | - This measure captures one narrow element of Action 4.8, but there is no way to adequately measure the remaining elements of the action.  - Measure 4g captures the numbers of people specifically in senior UN positions but is not able to evaluate the impact they are making regarding consideration of gender issues.  - Measure relates to action for which the Government does not have control (i.e. the UN will recruit people to fill these roles under a system of merit). Therefore ability to show a causal link between government action and Australians in these positions seems questionable. |
| Implications for reporting – 2014 | Description of Women, Peace and Security Training:  International Deployment Group Capacity Development Training session on the Role of Women in Capacity Development – AFP personnel complete a one hour classroom-based session on the role of women in capacity development, which forms part of a broader package of capacity development training. ACMC facilitated this process by providing an expert presenter. By the end of the session it is expected that participants will be able to:  - discuss the issues faced by women in failed states/conflict environments that led to the introduction of UNSCR 1325 and 1820  - show an understanding of UNSCR 1325 and 1820  - discuss the importance of the role of women in the process of capacity development. | - Without a clear measure, information is scattered throughout the progress report in different sections and is difficult to identify.  - Activities being undertaken by government agencies, which are related to this action are not being reported, captured or measured through this reporting mechanism.  - Without a clear measure, activities, which are reported, may not align with the relevant action. E.g. under ‘Support for humanitarian efforts’, Progress Report includes: ‘In March 2013, Defence funded three ADF women from the Australian Navy to participate in Habitat for Humanity project in Nepal…’ | Without an appropriate measure, information about this action is not reported on.  For Measure 4G, Progress Report states: ‘As at 31 December 2013, there were no Australians serving in senior UN decision-making positions relating to peace and security’.  Beyond numbers, the report would be unable to provide strategy to increase this number, since the recruitment process is not an Australian Government one. |

Source: Australian Government 2014

**Finding 6:** The absence of a baseline study restricts the ability to measure progress.

4.2.5 Measuring and attributing impact

Ban Ki-Moon has highlighted how ‘translating norms into practice must in the end be measured against real change in the lives of women, girls, boys and men across the continuum from conflict to peace.’ (Un Secretary-General 2012, p.4)

Impact measurement of Australian NAP implementation was identified as a particular area of concern for WPS stakeholders. The current M&E framework does not include impact indicators and thereby offers no way to measure impact.[[15]](#footnote-15) As highlighted in Lee-Koo’s analysis of the Australian NAP, the M&E framework ‘does not provide for evaluation’ of whether activities carried out under the actions are ‘sufficient in number or if they demonstrate that they have had a significant, positive or sustainable impact on organisations or post-conflict zones’ (2014, p. 307). As illustrated by the results chain in Figure 6 (drawn from OECD DAC 2013), **the current Australian NAP measures are primarily focused on ‘inputs’ and ‘activities’** (relating to numbers and descriptions as described above), rather than what those inputs and activities are intended to achieve – in terms of outputs, outcomes and impacts.[[16]](#footnote-16)

Figure 5: Results chain

INPUTS

ACTIVITIES

OUTPUTS

OUTCOMES

IMPACTS

| Financial, human and material resources used | Actions taken or work performed to transform inputs into outputs | Products, capital goods and services resulting in changes relevant to outcomes | Likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects | Positive and negative, long-term effects produced (intended or unintended) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |

Source: OECD DAC 2013

A number of government interviewees also identified measurement and attribution of impact of WPS efforts as a particular challenge. For Defence interviewees, measuring and attributing operational impacts for the Australian Defence Force are difficult given that Australia rarely works alone on the ground. Measuring and attributing impact is also a challenge in the aid program and in foreign policy efforts. For instance, many government interviewees highlighted that much foreign policy, diplomatic and advocacy work is not public therefore it is not publicly reported and measured as progress towards outcomes being sought on WPS work and women’s rights more broadly.

Others highlighted that where there have been great gains – for instance in ‘having women, peace and security as a standing item on high level partner meetings’ – this is often not captured as positive change. Further, in international efforts to support civil society and women’s organisations to engage in peacebuilding, there is often an ‘inability to attribute changes in peace processes solely to aid program efforts’.[[17]](#footnote-17)

**Measuring the impact of WPS efforts is a global challenge**. A recent research report by the OECD DAC Network on Gender Equality found that many NAPs ‘lack a robust monitoring and evaluation framework to evaluate impact on the ground’ (2015, p. 4). Further, the European Civil Society Dialogue Network conducted an analysis of 20 European NAPs and found little information is available on their impact in conflict-affected countries (Pasquinelli & Potter Prentice 2013). Similarly, a civil society assessment of the Canadian NAP indicators noted a lack of indicators that track broader impact (Woroniuk 2014).

There are three particular non-conflict donor countries that have addressed the challenge of measuring impact in their NAP revisions. Based on recommendations from the mid-term progress report (Hinds & McMinn 2013, p. 38), Ireland’s revised NAP includes specific actions aimed at building an evidence base on the impact of NAP implementation (Government of Ireland 2015, p. 21). The UK government has incorporated a similar emphasis on building a WPS evidence base in its current NAP (2014–17) and accompanying whole of government implementation plan to enhance understanding of what interventions work (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2014b, pp. 2, 4). Lastly, in the Dutch Government’s second NAP, the M&E framework includes qualitative monitoring and evaluation of the outcome and impact of the NAP using innovative participatory techniques (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2012, p. 40).

According to the Dutch governmental WPS Coordinator interviewed for this review, despite enhanced focus on M&E in the revision, M&E remains a challenge and confusion persists about what they want to and should be measuring. According to the interviewee, this is an area they hope to improve in their third NAP.

These examples are elaborated in Appendix G.

**Finding 7:** The measures contained in the Australian NAP M&E framework are not sufficient to track impact because the measures do not include outcome statements of the change that is desired.

4.2.6 Absence of an explicit overarching goal and objectives

The lack of an explicit overarching goal or objectives in the Australian NAP requires particular attention as it has implications for the utility of the M&E framework, including measuring the effectiveness of the Australian NAP.

OECD DAC criteria for evaluating development assistance includes ‘effectiveness’, defined as ‘a measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives’ (OECD n.d.). The M&E measures are unable to measure effectiveness as the Australian NAP’s objectives are not outlined. Currently, the Australian NAP does not include clear language on what kind of change it hopes to achieve (also addressed under theme 5 in Section 4.5). The closest statement to an overall goal is included in the Foreword to the Australian NAP: ‘The National Action Plan sets out what Australia will do, at home and overseas, to integrate a gender perspective into its peace and security efforts, protect women and girls’ human rights, and promote their participation in conflict prevention, management and resolution’. The five ‘strategies’ in the Australian NAP are articulated as objectives yet they ‘describe what the Australian Government will do to achieve better outcomes for women and girls against each of the five thematic areas’ (Australian Government 2012, p.19).

The lack of clarity in goals and objectives in the Australian NAP was reflected among some interviewees who revealed a lack of clarity about what the ultimate objectives of the Australian NAP actions are: are they ends in themselves (e.g. training on WPS), or are they the means to achieve larger objectives?

While the Australian NAP commits Australia to adopt a gender perspective in all peace and security processes and operating environments domestically and overseas, according to some interviewees, the ‘why’ of this work is not necessarily clear to those in some implementing agencies. Lee-Koo observed this in her own research on the Australian NAP, noting ‘information on the ground about the purpose and goals of the WPS agenda remains poor’ (2014, p. 308).

Australia’s lack of an explicit goal and objectives contrasts to a number of other non-conflict donor country NAPs, which are outlined in Appendix G.

**Finding 8:** The measures contained in the Australian NAP M&E framework are quantitative, not qualitative in nature.

4.2.7 Implications of the current M&E measures for government progress reporting).

The former Sex Discrimination Commissioner, Elizabeth Broderick, stressed the important of M&E stating ‘having the best plan in the world is not enough. We must make sure it is properly monitored and evaluated and it is having the impact we expect’ (2012). The current M&E measures have direct implications for the quality of the government’s biannual progress reports on Australian NAP implementation and their contribution to advancing the WPS agenda, because implementing agencies use the measures to guide their reporting. Specifically, the measures limit the ability and utility of the government’s progress reports to qualitatively assess progress and impact. The limitations of the measures from a reporting perspective was highlighted in the 2014 Progress Report, which presented a list of outputs, with no qualitative analysis or assessment of outcomes. Table 3 includes an illustration of the implications of the M&E measures for the qualitative content of government reporting, using a specific example of AFP reporting on a particular training initiative.[[18]](#footnote-18)

According to analyses of other non-conflict donor NAPs, progress reports present an important opportunity for implementing agencies to provide qualitative reflections and analysis of progress, gaps and challenges, including resistance met (Ormhaug 2014, p.79; Women, Peace and Security Network – Canada 2014). Several interviewees noted that the 2014 Progress Report described a lot of activities, however it did not draw them together to provide an overall assessment of achievements and progress. Some government interviewees noted that reporting using the Progress Report template was unable to capture the scope of their work. While the information and examples presented in the 2014 Progress Report provide an indication of a great deal of activity across government, the **reflections and qualitative analysis may be equally, if not more, important** than the presentation of quantitative and demographic data.

Some interviewees indicated that department or agency-specific implementation plans are a useful tool to mitigate the weaknesses of the current M&E framework and strengthen monitoring and evaluation more generally. This role is evident in Defence’s Implementation Plan (DIP), which presents an example for other departments and agencies (see Appendix H for more information).

According to one government interviewee, the DIP provides ‘additional layers of M&E and reporting’ and is ‘therefore much stronger than the Australian NAP framework’. The DIP facilitates and systematises monitoring and reporting of Australian NAP implementation, supported by the high-level WPS focal point in Defence (see theme 3 in Section 4.3), including regular internal six-monthly reporting by Services and Groups. Toward implementation of the DIP, Defence has developed Defence Outcomes for Australian implementation by 2018. These outcomes are intended to articulate what Defence is trying to achieve through implementation and to inform an evaluation process. Also, within the framework of the DIP, Joint Operations Command (JOC) is working with the Defence Science and Technology Organisation to develop measures of effectiveness to facilitate JOC’s implementation of the Australian NAP through its own implementation plan.

The measures will be tested over a six-month period and then rolled into the operational space. These measures could also be adapted more broadly within Defence or at least guide the development of measures of effectiveness in other sections of Defence.

In contrast to Defence, in departments and agencies without a focal point or implementation plan, some interviewees revealed a notable lack of systematic monitoring and reporting.

4.2.8 Recommendations

| Key finding | Corresponding recommendations for the Australian Government |
| --- | --- |
| 4 | Revise the measures in the Australian NAP M&E framework so that they can track progress of all the actions. |
| 5 | Develop a theory of change for the Australian NAP, including an overarching goal and specific targets for the Australian NAP against which progress can be measured. |
| 6 | Strengthen baseline data, including through a stocktake or audit by each implementing agency and through reporting financial allocations for Australian NAP implementation in preparation for the final review in 2018. |
| 7 | Revise the measures in the Australian NAP so that they can measure impact and effectiveness of the actions and strategies, including clear outcomes that are being sought. |
| 8 | Supplement existing quantitative measures with qualitative indicators to reflect perceptions of impact, including unintended consequences of activities undertaken under the Australian NAP.  Conduct a workshop to undertake joint analysis of the emerging trends to provide complementary qualitative data for the 2016 progress report.  Supplement quantitative data on numbers of Australian Government personnel trained before deploying to conflict or post-conflict settings with post-deployment perceptions about the impact and applicability of WPS training for day-to-day operations. |

## 4.3 Implementing the Australian NAP actions: gaps and challenges (theme 3)

**Finding 9:** The whole of government approach to implementing the Australian NAP can be strengthened.

4.3.1 Why is a whole of government approach important?

One of the main purposes of the Australian NAP is to ‘[e]stablish a clear framework for a coordinated, whole of government approach to implementing UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions’ (Australian Government 2012, p. 15). While some progress has been made at the whole of government level, such as the establishment and biannual meetings of the WPS Inter-Department Working Group (IDWG), the existing whole of government approach to Australian NAP implementation has scope for improvement.

Reflections from some government interviewees suggest that current practice related to the WPS IDWG, which broadly has critical value for government coordination, requires attention to enable coordination and information-sharing across and within government. Previously, IDWG members were required to report to one another on a six-monthly basis. The biennial progress report is, according to the same interviewee, the ‘only way to see what everyone is doing’.

In addition, an interviewee commented that there has been inconsistent participation by some agencies in IDWG meetings, making it difficult to build effective relationships on WPS among all governmental agencies. Also, according to other interviewees, beyond those who attend the IDWG, its role is unclear, suggesting that IDWG attendees could improve their updates and reports to colleagues on the discussions and actions from the IDWG meetings.

While there is a wealth of WPS activity taking place across government, several interviewees indicated that WPS work is often done in isolation across departments and agencies and even within them on work with shared relevance. One government interviewee remarked ‘there is not real collaboration’ on WPS. Several interviewees recognised that there is much greater room for coordination within and across departments.

Isolation of WPS activity between government agencies has also been observed in Nordic NAP countries (Jukarainen & Puumala 2014, p. 31) and in Ireland (Hinds & McMinn 2013, p. 41) (see Appendix G).

At the same time, among some agencies, interviewees emphasised that coordination is working well. In the Pacific, for instance, the Attorney-General’s Department’s work on legislation has reinforced AFP’s work, including on issues such as domestic violence. In addition, one interviewee described ACMC as a ‘useful bridge’ between the whole of government approach and civil society.

**Finding 10:** The extent to which agencies embed implementation of the Australian NAP is uneven; this results in limited institutionalisation and Australian NAP awareness in some agencies.

4.3.2 There is uneven institutionalisation across government

The challenge in achieving a coordinated, whole of government approach is partly due to uneven institutionalisation of the Australian NAP within government. As highlighted in research by Lee- Koo with government representatives, ‘it has been largely the responsibility of individual entrepreneurs or gender champions within organisations to raise awareness of the plan and their department’s responsibilities in relation to it’ (2013, p. 306).

Uneven institutionalisation is illustrated by the fact that Defence is the only implementing agency to have established a high-level departmental WPS focal point and developed a department-specific action plan. According to UN Women’s Guidelines for National Implementation, department-specific measures ‘ensure thorough internalisation of WPS goals within government’ (2012, p. 9).

The significant role of agency-specific plans is reflected in the US NAP (2011–15), which directs the State Department, the Department of Defence and the US Agency for International Development to develop their own implementation plans within 150 days (The White House 2011, p. 23).[[19]](#footnote-19)

At a domestic level, Lee-Koo argues that, to be successful, the Australian NAP ‘needs to be a coordinated priority, and implementing departments need to develop clearly articulated and publicly communicated strategies for their own implementation frameworks’ (2014, p. 311). She also argues that the lack of department-specific action plans in particular challenges ‘coordinated whole-of-government implementation of the (Australian) NAP’ (2014, p. 306).

Several government and civil society interviewees highlighted the need for departmental implementation plans for implementation of the NAP. However, interviews with representatives of two departments suggested that there is limited appetite to develop their own implementation plans, in part due to a concern about duplication of reporting responsibilities and additional workload that would result from it.

With existing strategies, plans and policies, and in a climate of limited resources, in the words of one government interviewee an additional implementation plan seems ‘too much’.

The uneven institutionalisation of the Australian NAP is reflected in how it drives WPS programming in some, but not all, departments and agencies. The interviews revealed stark differences in the use of the Australian NAP as a driver of WPS policy and programming among government departments and agencies.

Defence and DFAT provide a useful example of the differences.

A review of Defence documentation and interviews with Defence personnel clearly demonstrate that, in Defence, the Australian NAP guides all of its work on WPS. For Defence interviewees, the Australian NAP is the ‘primary driver’ of everything they have been doing in this area. They describe the Australian NAP as the ‘point of reference for everyone’. Appendix H features a detailed case study on institutionalisation of the Australian NAP within Defence.

In contrast to the institutionalisation described above in Defence, in DFAT, the Australian NAP is a recognised important whole of government policy, yet interviewees who work on WPS suggest that the plan itself is not guiding foreign policy, development or humanitarian assistance policy and programming on WPS issues. According to interviewees, there is often a distinction between the Australian and the WPS agenda. One likely reason for this is that Australia’s aid program has been working on WPS matters for many years prior to the Australian NAP, including country programming in Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands and Bougainville (Whittington 2011).[[20]](#footnote-20) As highlighted in Australia’s report on implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action, ‘the National Action Plan consolidates and builds on the broad programme of work already underway’ on WPS efforts, which pre-dated development of the Plan (DPMC 2014a).

According to DFAT interviewees, WPS efforts are guided by a range of other factors in addition to the Australian NAP, including country contexts, international partners’ priorities, global donor priorities, the Foreign Minister’s priorities, international best practice, the government’s Gender Equality Strategy, the Protection in Humanitarian Action Framework, the Humanitarian Action Policy, and international initiatives such as the PSVI and Global Call to Action on Gender-Based Violence in emergencies, among others. DFAT programming in countries such as Afghanistan and Burma includes in-depth work on the WPS agenda, however, much of this work is not described as being primarily driven or framed by the Australian NAP. One exception noted by some interviewees is when staff are required to complete briefing requests, including the reporting requirements for the 2014 Progress Report.

As the Australian NAP is not the sole driver of WPS programming for DFAT, the institutional architecture to support Australian NAP implementation is not as strong as it could be. There were contradictory impressions about who is accountable for Australian NAP implementation. For instance, responses among interviewees about who had accountability for Australian NAP implementation included the Gender Equality Branch, the DFAT representative to the IDWG, Country teams, the Ambassador for Women and Girls and the Foreign Minister. As highlighted by one interviewee, ‘without responsibility written into individual performance plans of senior executives, the question of accountability will remain elusive.’ A number of interviewees also considered the integration of foreign policy and the aid program into the same department as an opportunity to socialise the Australian NAP so that, in the words of one interviewee, ‘WPS can be seen as relevant across program areas’. As such, there appears to be opportunities to further support strengthening a robust institutional architecture for Australian NAP implementation within a newly integrated department.

4.3.3 Awareness about the Australian NAP is uneven within government

Limited awareness of the Australian NAP within government was noted in various documents. For instance, an Australian academic analysis states that ‘persistent and widespread misperceptions’ exist among the ‘broader foreign policy and security community as to what the goals and claims of the WPS agenda are’ (Lee-Koo 2014, p. 301). Further, the 2013 Annual Civil Society Report Card identified a concern whether Australian representatives, especially those in senior leadership positions including overseas are ‘appropriately conversant’ on key WPS matters (Humanitarian Advisory Group 2013, p. 12).

Some interviewees also reflected that awareness about the Australian NAP, including the concepts of Resolution 1325, remains limited in government. While DFAT does extensive work in the WPS arena, since the Australian NAP itself is not described as the primary or sole driver of their work (examined in Section 4.3.2), some interviewees indicated there is limited knowledge of its detail.

Staff have described there being ‘little awareness of the Australian NAP except for those managing gender-related programs, even when in [a] country we are actually doing women, peace and security work’.

There was a recurring message among DFAT interviewees that while there is awareness of the Australian NAP and its importance as a policy framework, for those who work on WPS issues, **there is less awareness of the specific actions and accountabilities within the plan**. According to some interviewees, understanding varies among WPS issues with some areas better understood than others. For instance, in DFAT, understanding of protection and sexual and gender-based violence is stronger than conflict prevention, women’s participation and undertaking gendered conflict analysis. Further, there was also a concern amongst some that across government, WPS issues sometimes continue to be seen as ‘women’s issues’ rather than about approaches to peace and security.

One interviewee highlighted that the 15th anniversary of Resolution 1325 and release of the Global Study present **opportunities to once again socialise and highlight the importance of the Australian NAP** within government. This was also confirmed by two interviewees working on humanitarian issues, who highlighted that there would be opportunities for this.

**Finding 11:** There is uneven funding and resource allocation across implementing agencies.

4.3.4 Australian NAP implementation is unevenly funded and resourced across agencies

Marking 15 years since UNSCR 1325 was passed, Oxfam released a report on WPS that states, ‘without an adequate, dedicated budget, a national…action plan…resembles a care without fuel: it may be well designed, bit it remains incapable of moving forward.’ (2015, p 4)

The Australian NAP does not identify any government budgetary allocation for implementation of the Australian NAP (Australian Government 2012). This includes budgetary allocation both for internal work within departments and agencies (human resources, capacity building, training, coordination) and externally in support of peace and security work through diplomatic, development, defence, humanitarian and policing work. This is reflected in **the absence of any reference to financing in the M&E framework** (see theme 2 in Section 4.2) and **the absence of any public reporting on spending in the 2014 Progress Report**.

The situation in Defence illustrates well the implications of the absence of dedicated budgetary allocation for Australian NAP implementation. Despite its extensive commitments under the Australian NAP, Defence has not allocated any explicit funds to implement the DIP. The Director National Action Plan for Women, Peace and Security does not have a dedicated budget but has to implement Australian NAP responsibilities within existing resources. According to one Defence interviewee, ‘we are managing: that’s what we do as military officers’. While committed individuals are making important progress, without a dedicated budget, opportunities to advance and accelerate implementation of the WPS agenda can be jeopardised.

In contrast, the Gender Equality Section in DFAT, which coordinates Australian NAP implementation, does have some funding for WPS-related policy and programme work, as well as staff devoted to Australian NAP implementation. As WPS-related work, the funding is implicitly for NAP implementation but is not explicitly tied to it. This is partly due to the aid program funding WPS-related research and programmes before the development of the Australian NAP. According to some interviewees, this funding, however, does not have a measured baseline and is not publicly reported alongside country or regional spending on NAP implementation.

An extensive stocktake was undertaken by DFAT to feed into the 2014 Progress Report, which included the financial allocations of work within the aid program (prior to integration into DFAT). This may be repeated as a good practice during the life of the Australian NAP, however that process is internal to the department.

4.3.5 Global lack of funding

Australia’s lack of explicit funding for Australian NAP implementation is not unusual and is a focus of concerted global attention. Indeed, Lakshmi Puri, Deputy Executive Director of UN Women, states ‘I cannot think of other areas in international policymaking where there’s a bigger gap between the rhetorical support and the actual financial support.’ (2015) According to 2013 data gathered by the WILPF PeaceWomen programme, 90 per cent of NAPs do not have budgets (WILPF PeaceWomen 2013, p 12). The issue of financing is increasingly highlighted by civil society, UN and other experts as a key factor limiting progress on global and national WPS implementation (NGO Working Group, 2015; OECD DAC Network on Gender Equality 2015; Coomarasawamy 2015).[[21]](#footnote-21)

In his 2014 report on Women, Peace and Security, the UN Secretary-General noted that financing for WPS ‘remains inadequate’ and called on Member States to ‘ensure that national and regional action plans on women, peace and security are well financed and that dedicated budget lines are included in all peace, security and peacebuilding initiatives’ (paragraph 78). In CEDAW General Recommendation 30, the Committee recommends that State Parties ensure that ‘**adequate budgets are allocated for their implementation**‘ (CEDAW 2013, para. 28a).[[22]](#footnote-22)

The global attention to financing for national implementation is reflected in recent non-conflict donor NAP revisions. According to George Washington University’s major content analysis of NAPs from Western European countries, revised NAPs ‘tend to be more specific with regards to financial allocation’ (Miller, Pournik & Swaine 2014, p. 35). The Netherlands’ NAP (2012–15) is a notable example, providing an overview of commitments in financial and/or human resources (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2012, p. 43) (see more detail and other examples in Appendix G).

The WPS Coordinator in the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs interviewed for this interim review explained that, based on their experience implementing the revised NAP, having explicit financial and human resource commitments in the NAP has ‘made the cooperation [with civil society] much more concrete…and more visible’. A number of civil society interviewees highlighted this very point – they felt that more concrete and visible information on human and financial commitments would enable greater collaboration and ability to advance the WPS agenda.

4.3.6 Recommendations

| Key finding | Corresponding recommendations for the Australian Government |
| --- | --- |
| 9 | Develop a publicly available whole of government implementation plan to strengthen transparency and coordination across agencies, encourage joint initiatives and facilitate institionalisation of the Australian NAP. |
| 10 | Undertake a ‘stocktake’ or audit in the lead up to each progress report to enhance information sharing on all WPS activities and provide additional baseline data.  Make members of the WPS IDWG and its sub-committee designated WPS focal points who are accountable for Australian NAP implementation for their agency.  Release six-monthly informal WPS IDWG updates to enhance information sharing. |
| 11 | Enhance reporting on resourcing and financial allocations of Australian NAP implementation, including in the second Progress Report (to help prepare baseline for the final review and the Australian NAP revision).  Ensure there is a dedicated budget allocated to the Australian NAP implementation (linked to the whole of government implementation plan). |

## 4.4 Opportunities for collaboration between government and civil society (theme 4)

**Finding 12:** The Australian Government values the role of civil society in implementing the WPS agenda, however opportunities for formal engagement are limited.

4.4.1 Civil society and the WPS agenda

Resolution 1325 and the WPS agenda that has emerged from it in the last 15 years would not have existed without the advocacy and push from global civil society. According to an American WPS scholar, the ‘entire groundwork for [Resolution 1325], including the initial drafting, and the political work of preparing Security Council members to accept that the resolution was relevant to and had precedents in the SC’s work, was done by NGOs’ (Cohn 2004: 4). Civil society has been at the forefront of the WPS agenda ever since – globally, regionally, domestically across conflict and non-conflict countries, including in Australia.

There appears to be ongoing interest for government to enhance its engagement with civil society by creating more opportunities to share and advance the WPS agenda.

Interestingly, there are conflicting impressions from government and civil society actors on their relationship. Frequent references have been made in Australian Government statements and interventions about the close partnership and cooperation that exists (Cash 2014c; Lewis 2012; Williams 2013). However, this impression is not shared by many civil society representatives; nor is it shared by some working on these issues in government departments.

Through the Annual Civil Society Report Card, Australian civil society organisations have been able to voice their concerns about the government’s role and engagement with civil society and suggest avenues for improvement to build ‘robust and intentional engagement’ between civil society and government (Humanitarian Advisory Group 2013).

4.4.2 Civil society’s involvement with the Australian NAP

The Australian Government recognises and values the critical role of civil society both in Australia and overseas in the global, regional and national WPS effort. According to the ‘Women, Peace and Security Australian Civil Society Engagement Strategy’, developed by the WPS IDWG, the government recognises that ‘CSOs will play an important role in the implementation of the Australian NAP through monitoring, providing feedback and holding government to account on its commitments’ (Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 2013, p. 1).

This assertion is supported by Senator Michaelia Cash, formerly Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Women and currently Minister for Women who has stated 'there is an invaluable wealth of knowledge on Women, Peace and Security issues that exists within civil society organisations’ (2014a).

Government interviewees consistently referenced civil society as a valued and critical actor in implementation of the WPS agenda. They identified that **civil society contributions extend far beyond keeping government accountable**, including the role civil society plays in providing valuable feedback, technical and research expertise, a different perspective, including partner organisations overseas, up to date information and first-hand experience of WPS matters.

According to one government interviewee, civil society organisations are ‘far more nimble than government, are the ones providing services, are vital sources of information, can change direction, have local knowledge and have different capacities than governments’.

According to another interviewee, at a country level, women’s civil society organisations (referenced in this context relating to Burma, Afghanistan and the Philippines) are seen as ‘key informants, partners, interlocutors on the peace process that Australia cannot work without’. The technical expertise and understanding civil society actors possess is especially important, considering the lack of such technical expertise within some areas of government (as discussed under theme 3 in Section 4.3).

The value accorded to civil society advice, analysis and opinions is reflected in the engagement of various departments and agencies with civil society and their approach to civil society expertise. For example, as described by a Defence interviewee, civil society’s recommendations in the Annual Report Card are deemed equally as important as NATO policy to inform the DIP and are directly integrated into the DIP, where relevant.

Importantly, within DFAT, interviewees identified strong examples of collaboration with civil society on WPS matters, both domestically and internationally. This included examples of consultation with civil society within Australia during the development of the Australian NAP, and in supporting civil society organisations (focused on women’s rights) to implement Resolution 1325 and the WPS agenda in countries experiencing or recovering from conflict, also detailed in a range of DFAT publications (2010, 2015).

Likewise, AFP has a strong record of engaging with civil society groups internationally, with a particular focus on the Pacific. AFP not only consults with civil society, but also involves civil society groups in bringing about positive change through facilitating gender training of Pacific female police officers and supporting studies on violence against women in the region (DPMC 2014a).

The interviews revealed a difference in how government departments see the role of civil society: from being a partner in Australia and overseas, to a role solely holding government accountable. As highlighted by one government official involved in the Australian NAP process over many years, ‘civil society has played a strong role in developing the Australian NAP. However, you can’t be inside the tent so far that you are then unable to critique it. We got the balance right with civil society for this first (Australian) NAP’.

For organisations that are provided government funding to implement research and programmes related to WPS through the aid programme, some consider that these funding relationships serve to limit their ability to advocate and keep government accountable for their commitments under the Australian NAP.

4.4.3 Government engagement with diaspora communities, academia and research institutions

While government recognises civil society as being a critical WPS actor, the interviews with civil society participants, supported by the literature, highlighted two important sectors within civil society with which government currently under-engages, who can make significant contributions to help collectively advance the WPS agenda: diaspora communities, in particular conflict-affected women, and academia and research institutions.

**Diaspora communities**

According to several civil society interviewees, ‘proper’ and ‘meaningful’ engagement with diaspora communities across Australia, specifically with women who have fled war, is currently not happening. Instead, engagement is ‘relatively ad hoc’. According to one interviewee, these women represent a an important perspective – diaspora women from conflict-affected environments have the knowledge and experience to support contextual analysis of conflict countries and provide updated information on crises to inform Australia’s WPS efforts. However, the WPS agenda is not known to these communities, potentially limiting their ability to contribute to the WPS agenda. Other non-conflict donor NAP countries provide potential models for engagement with diaspora communities. For instance, in Ireland, diaspora organisations have been actively involved in NAP development and implementation (Government of Ireland 2015, p. 18) (see Appendix G).

**Academia and research institutions**

Academics and research institutions have a particularly unique role to play in supporting implementation of the WPS agenda at a national level, yet the potential of this role is currently under-utilised by the Australian Government.

According to leading WPS scholars in Australia, Dr Laura Shepherd and Dr Jacqui True, 'there are not adequate channels for the Australian Government to use and share Australian research and lessons learned, especially from the Asia and the Pacific region, that puts WPS at the centre of knowledge and understanding’ (Shepherd & True 2014, p. 269).

Three particular dimensions of the unique role of academia and research institutions are increasing clear. First, academics and research institutions have a unique role to play helping to build a rigorous, research-based evidence base (Shepherd & True 2014). For one interviewee, this research role is especially critical for evaluating the impact of the Australian NAP at the country-level. This is a priority issue globally, as the WPS agenda is plagued by limited evidence of what works and what doesn’t work in implementation of the agenda (Domingo et al. 2013; Hinds and McMinn 2013). The Global Network of Women Peacebuilders and UN Women have highlighted the role of researchers in building the evidence base on WPS matters (Cabrera-Balleza et al. 2014, p. 14; UN Women 2013, p.19).

Second, several civil society interviewees emphasised the particular role of academia and research institutions to serve as a community resource to help build awareness on WPS, facilitate discussion and the sharing of ideas. One interviewee sees the potential for an Australian version of the London School of Economics’ Centre for Women, Peace and Security,[[23]](#footnote-23) that would ‘provide a focal point for community engagement and outreach’ on WPS.

Third, several interviewees emphasised the uniqueness of the independence of academic and research institutions. According to one interviewee, this independence means they do not have to adhere to any particular agendas. In the words of another interviewee, ‘academics have a responsibility to speak truth to power – to say government is doing it wrong and needs to do it better. There is often an unrealistic expectation for civil society to take on that role. Academics are in a position of distinct privilege in this dialogue.’

Academia and research institutions are recognised as critical players in NAP implementation in a number of non-conflict donor countries, among them Norway, Finland and the Netherlands. Examples from Norway and Finland are examined in Appendix G. The Netherlands’ experience with research institutions may provide some useful lessons for Australia. Research institutions are among the signatories to the Dutch NAP and are considered to provide ‘knowledge on gender in conflict situations and encourage thinking beyond stereotypes and preconceptions’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2012 p. 3). According to the Dutch Government representative interviewed for this interim review, the government is currently reflecting on ways to improve this engagement with research institutions as they develop their third NAP. In particular, they have learned there needs to be greater explicit dialogue about the types of research material required by policymakers so the research produced is relevant to them.

**Finding 13:** There is a desire from civil society to increase engagement, however resourcing is a limiting factor.

4.4.4 Civil society desire to increase engagement in Australian NAP implementation

Civil society representatives emphasised a strong desire to increase their current level of engagement in Australian NAP implementation. **Civil society would like to engage as active partners alongside government on WPS, however, from their perspective, this type of partnership is currently not taking place**. For one interviewee, the WPS agenda is ‘still seen too much as a government-driven agenda’. For another, there is a sense that civil society is being ‘kept at arm’s length’. According to the 2014 Civil Society Report Card, civil society actors involved in WPS consider their role as confined to that of ‘beneficiary’, rather than participants and resources (Steering Committee of the Annual Civil Society Dialogue 2014, 13).

One interviewee expressed frustration about civil society’s limited access to decision-making roles and described observer roles as ‘not entirely respectful of civil society importance in this space’. For several other interviewees, a key challenge to enhanced engagement is the lack of a definition of ‘civil society’ in the Australian NAP.

Some civil society interviewees expressed particular concerns about the existing modes of engagement with government. In the words of one interviewee, ‘oftentimes the mode of engagement is exclusionary and doesn't lend itself to effective consultation and collaboration’. Examples provided of this exclusionary engagement include short-notice, Canberra-based meetings, with participation at own cost. A number of interviewees emphasised that this is especially problematic for smaller, more resource-constrained organisations based in other parts of the country. From the perspective of one civil society interviewee, ‘the government is not set up to deal with small organisations.’ For another interviewee, government engagement with civil society also often **fails to recognise the diversity** within it, when they are asked to identify one representative to speak on behalf of all of civil society.

Civil society also identified specific ways their engagement with government has been hindered. A number of civil society interviewees highlighted that the process of the government developing a Civil Society Engagement Strategy (through OfW) was inadequate and reflected ‘a misunderstanding of their respective roles.’ It was also noted that after government circulated the strategy for comment, a final version has not been made public or used as a tool to support civil society engagement for Australian NAP implementation.

Another interviewee expressed disappointment in their interactions with the IDWG, which they described as involving ‘little substantive engagement or interest; with an unclear role for civil society work to be taken into account’ further to satisfying a mandatory requirement to do so. One department has also been particularly singled out for its lack of engagement with civil society: according to the 2014 Civil Society Report Card: the Attorney-General’s Department has had ‘little engagement with the WPS agenda and there has been little or no engagement with civil society actors on the agenda’ (Steering Committee of the Annual Civil Society Dialogue 2014, p. 20).

4.4.5 Civil society engagement in Australian NAP implementation strengthened through resourcing

Under the Australian NAP, the Australian Government is required to ‘support domestic NGOs…and international civil society organisations to engage in peace and security initiatives’ and to ‘support Australian and international civil society organisations to promote the roles and address the needs of women in the prevention, management and resolution of conflict’ (Australian Government 2012, p. 22). Without budgetary allocation in the Australian NAP and reporting on funding, existing documentation does not address this topic. However, the interviews indicated that **enhanced financial resourcing by government would strengthen engagement between government and critical civil society actors** – particularly women’s rights organisations, networks and movements in implementation of the WPS agenda. As highlighted by Cordaid & the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders, ‘funding women’s rights group and movements would go far in addressing the “implementation deficit” faced by the WPS agenda’ (2014, p. 20).

A number of civil society representatives noted that government funding of the annual civil society dialogue and report card is viewed as a central and important component of this engagement. However, according to a number of interviewees, in Australia, a significant amount of civil society WPS work is currently self-funded – including engaging in WPS discussions in Canberra (such as the Civil Society dialogue), in the Asia Pacific region and in New York during meetings such as the UN Commission on the Status of Women and WPS Security Council Open Debates and meetings. Even when civil society actors are invited to present as experts and their work is valued, including by the Australian Government, as one civil society representative noted, ‘we still have to fund ourselves to get into those spaces’. This self-funding was described as ‘hugely limiting’ for civil society actors, resulting in ad hoc and reduced engagement.

Funding for civil society work on WPS is a global challenge. The draft recommendations from the Global Study have highlighted that financing for civil society is one of the five key areas of recommendations (Coomoraswamy 2015). According to the OECD, there is consensus that, despite rhetorical commitment, funding (and particularly core funding) for women’s rights groups and civil society more generally is difficult to track and is neither sufficient nor predictable (OECD DAC 2015).[[24]](#footnote-24) In 2013, UN Security Council Resolution 2122 (UNSC 2013) called for UN Member States to commit to long-term and dedicated funding support to women’s organisations in crisis contexts. One mechanism to achieve this has been through the development of the WPS Global Acceleration Instrument (GAI): a multi-stakeholder pooled funding mechanism that is dedicated to accelerating implementation of Resolution 1325 (GNWP 2015). The GAI encourages Member States to ‘provide evidence for attribution of the donor funds to results achieved, as well as increase measurability of impact ‘(GNWP 2015).

**Australia was the first donor to publically support the GAI in 2015, pledging AUD 1.5 million over two years**. Several civil society representatives interviewed welcomed this contribution, noting that it presents a critical opportunity for government and civil society to come together and draw on each other’s strengths.

4.4.6 Opportunities exist for government to enhance its engagement with civil society

In the Australian NAP, 'the government acknowledges that greater efforts to draw on civil society expertise will benefit the government's implementation of the (Australian) NAP' (Australian Government 2012, p. 77). Through the Civil Society Report Card, civil society organisations have called for a ‘genuine partnership’, built through a ‘program of regular and structured consultations, including regular meetings with the WPS IDWG (Steering Committee of the Annual Civil Society Dialogue 2014). In the words of one civil society interviewee, ‘civil society doesn’t just need resources but is a resource itself’.

A range of opportunities for enhancing engagement between government and civil society have been identified including:

1. Establishment of the **Australian Civil Society Coalition on Women, Peace and Security** in 2013 is an opportunity for improved engagement, aiming to provide a ‘coordinated structure to facilitate governmental access to civil society expertise’ (Steering Committee of the Annual Civil Society Dialogue 2014, p. 15). Civil society interviewees repeatedly mentioned the need for government funding for the Coalition secretariat, to better enable critical outreach, coordination, communication and participation. Several interviewees also noted that the Coalition’s internal workings and cohesion require some attention to enable it to play its role effectively.
2. The 2013 Civil Society Report Card suggested that a stronger platform for engagement could be built through a **mapping exercise of civil society actors and stakeholders**, including researchers and diaspora organisations, working on WPS matters (Humanitarian Advisory Group 2013). This recommendation was echoed by one civil society interviewee who suggested that ‘mapping ensures a proper directory of reference for continuing implementation of the (Australian) NAP’. Another civil society interviewee also highlighted this idea, noting that it could provide a practical way to demonstrate working together in partnership. A related point raised by several civil society interviewees highlighted the need to have clearly defined roles to ensure mutually beneficial strategic collaboration.[[25]](#footnote-25)
3. The 2013 Civil Society Report Card also identified **joint training and lessons learned exercises** as a key entry point for improved engagement with civil society where they can provide valuable technical expertise (Humanitarian Advisory Group 2013). This was reiterated in the 2014 Report Card (Steering Committee of the Annual Civil Society Dialogue 2014) and was also highlighted by several civil society interviewees.
4. In the 2014 Progress Report, the OfW reported that they were investigating options for a ‘**stronger internet presence for the National Action Plan** to facilitate greater sharing of information on Government activities and progress with civil society and the general public’ (Australian Government 2014, p. 33). It is unclear from available information whether this option is being pursued, however, this a worthwhile initiative that would support enhanced engagement and address issues of limited public information and transparency.
5. **Formal monitoring arrangements for civil society** were seen by civil society interviewees as valuable in engaging as formal partnerships with government on Australian NAP implementation, with the majority suggesting a formal monitoring role. For a number of interviewees, this formal role would only be beneficial and enhance implementation if government is willing to provide information to enable monitoring, and if attendant financial resources accompany the monitoring role. For one interviewee, this formal role should be reflected in the establishment of an inclusive monitoring team with representatives from government, civil society, diaspora groups and regional civil society representatives. The 2011 UN Secretary-General’s report on WPS cited a ‘formal monitoring role for civil society organizations’ as one of a number of ‘good practices’ on coordination and reporting on NAPs (p. 20).

Other non-conflict donor countries offer potential models and avenues for enhancing formal engagement with civil society. The Netherlands represents the only NAP in which civil society is a co-signatory.[[26]](#footnote-26)

According to the Dutch Government WPS Coordinator interviewed for this review, the Dutch NAP is ‘a responsibility of both government and civil society…is it very much a common effort.’

For the Netherlands, the formalised role of civil society in NAP implementation has built their networks with civil society and research institutions. In the words of the WPS Coordinator in the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also quoted above, if civil society input is needed on an issue, ‘we know who to call and who to ask for. We know each other, we know how to find each other’.

In the United Kingdom, Gender Action for Peace and Security (GAPS), a civil society network, is considered a ‘main partner’ for government (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2014a). Ireland’s Monitoring Group is chaired by an independent appointee from outside government and comprises equal representation of government implementing agencies and civil society experts, including academics (Tunney & McMinn 2013). For additional examples from Belgium, Austria, and the US, see Appendix G.

While many lessons and good practices are still emerging from these approaches to formal civil society engagement, some of which are still quite young, a number of civil society interviewees emphasised that much could be learnt from these different approaches.

**Finding 14:** There are challenges around coordination for civil society and its strategic approach to engaging with government on Australian NAP issues.

4.4.7 Limited formal opportunities for engagement between government and Australian civil society

Despite government recognition of its significance and value in Australian NAP implementation, civil society has limited formal opportunities for sustained engagement with government under the Australian NAP. Of these opportunities it is often only limited number of civil society members who can attend these fora.

First, the WPS IDWG, which convenes biannually, meets once per year with representatives of the Australian Civil Society Coalition on Women, Peace and Security. This is expected to change in late 2015 with a single civil society representative from the Coalition invited to join as an observer member. This is an important development as it better reflects the valuable role of civil society. However, a number of civil society interviewees raised a concern about this role being an ‘observer’ role, which may ‘diminish the value of civil society contributions’ and ‘limit the ability to actually provide useful advice’.

Second, civil society engages with government implementing agencies through the annual one-day Civil Society Dialogue, which includes government presentations and dialogue with civil society participants, and culminates in development of the annual Civil Society Report Card. Concerns were raised in several interviews over the government’s engagement with the Civil Society Dialogue and Report Card process. For those able to be part of this process, it is often the only opportunity to hear updates from government departments on WPS activities. Many civil society representatives expressed concern over uneven participation across departments, including a lack of participation from key implementing departments and some departments ‘leaving after delivering speeches and no real interest in listening to discussion.’ These concerns were compounded by, as one interviewee noted, the very limited formal engagement of follow-up of the IDWG when the Report Card was presented to them.

Third, the Defence Working Group includes one civil society representative. This role was initially held by the Executive Director of the Australian National Committee for UN Women and since 2015, has been held by a member of the Australian Council for International Development seconded to the Australian Civil Military Centre.

Fourth, there have been a number of one-off initiatives such as the invitation to specific civil society representatives to the DFAT-coordinated Australian Dialogue on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict held at Parliament House in June 2014, which aimed to inform the government’s approach to the issue. Also, civil society, including academics and research institutions, were engaged during Australia’s UN Security Council term (2012 to 2014) through consultations with the UNSC Taskforce in Canberra. Four civil society interviewees during this review highlighted these consultations as a positive experience of collaboration. This included one interviewee describing the consultations as ‘a high point’, which ‘catalysed new discussions’. Further, it was described as ‘inclusive, educative, strategic, respectful, impressive. A good model for collaboration. There was buy in from government and civil society. The UNSC seat was an all-in moment’.

Beyond the specific limited formal opportunities for sustained engagement detailed above, some civil society interviewees also identified two factors that hinder their existing engagement. One is the **limited human and financial resources in Office for Women as the coordinating agency**, which limits their ability to effectively coordinate and engage with civil society. Secondly, **sustained engagement and partnership with civil society is hampered by limited information sharing and transparency**. During the interim review, a number of civil society members voiced their concern about the limited public information available on Australian NAP implementation, and women, peace and security engagement more broadly. As one civil society actor asked, ‘how can we balance the role of working together in partnership, or begin to keep government and ourselves to account, when we don’t even know what work government are doing…?’ This limited transparency is visible in existing government reporting. To date, the biennial Progress Report has limited information with which civil society can engage government, including qualitative assessment of achievements, progress and impact and financial reporting. Also, some of the government’s work through the aid program is highlighted through case studies in publications every five years (DFAT 2010; DFAT 2015).

4.4.8 Recommendations

| Key finding | Corresponding recommendations for the Australian Government and  civil society |
| --- | --- |
| 12 | Review and strengthen the Civil Society Engagement Strategy in a participatory process which ensures that diaspora groups, academia and research institutions are fully incorporated.  In partnership with civil society, identify opportunities for strategic and formal engagement such as joint training, sharing lessons learnt and country-specific learning opportunities on WPS issues. |
| 13 | Assess the feasibility of providing financial support to the secretariat for the Australian Civil Society Coalition for Women, Peace & Security, to better enable more effective outreach and coordination.  Secure resources for the Office for Women to increase the required information sharing, transparency and engagement. |
| 14 | Civil society should undertake a mapping exercise, with increased inclusion of different civil society actors, to enhance coordination with the government in relation to the Australian NAP. |

## 4.5 Laying the groundwork for the final review in 2018 (theme 5)

**Finding 15:** The final review of the Australian NAP will need to be intrinsically linked to the revision process for the second iteration of the Australian NAP.

**The final review will be a key process that will inform the second iteration of the Australian NAP.** Alreadythere are a wealth of suggestions and practical ideas for consideration during future discussions about the development of a second Australian NAP.

First, civil society should be more integrated into the drafting process. Based on evidence collected, other NAPs that have been developed through an inclusive process, ‘in which [civil society organisations] are involved as advocates, drafters and implementers have a better chance of being implemented’ (Pasquinelli & Prentice 2013, p. 7).

Second, the Australian Government should consider engaging in a ‘twinning’ exercise, an idea developed by the Irish Government (Miller, Pournik & Swaine 2014, p. 25) to cooperate with other relevant NAP countries through joint meetings, exchanging lessons learnt, good practice and experiences. Australia might consider twinning with a country in the region as well as a non-conflict donor country at a similar point in its NAP development.

**Finding 16:** A rigorous, participatory review framework will be needed to undertake the final review in 2018.

4.5.1 Key principles to guide the final review

**1) Planning for utilisation**

This principle means the review plans for utilisation from the outset. The intended users of the evaluation are identified, along with their information and evidence needs.

What does this look like in practice? Users help draft the terms of reference, draft findings are presented to users/key stakeholders in a workshop, ask users to design the dissemination strategy.

**2) Evaluator impartiality and independence**

This principle means an evaluator is selected without a direct stake in the results of the evaluation.

What does this look like in practice? A public tender may considered.

**3) Achieving a balance between accountability and learning**

This principle means the review has a dual purpose of accountability and learning. The process is as important as the final product.

What does this look like in practice? A focus on results, as well as identifying what is working well and what could be improved; balance input from external stakeholders with those directly involved; data collection uses mixed methods; circulation of report is in the public domain.

**4) Prioritising contribution over attribution of impact**

This principle means results and impact are viewed within the context of other actors operating in the WPS space. The evaluation focuses on evidence of contribution.

What does this look like in practice? Mapping of actions and impact within the context of broader actions and achievement.

**5) Promoting dialogue and improving cooperation among stakeholders**

This principle means the evaluation process itself contributes to coherence and coordination of WPS actors.

What does this look like in practice? Opportunity for different stakeholders to come together to review results (such as multi-stakeholder focus groups or findings workshops).

**6) Integrating gender equality into evaluation**

This principle means that gender equality is explicitly integrated into all stages of the evaluation process.

What does this look like in practice? Stakeholder analysis is disaggregated by sex and age, as are qualitative perspectives and quantitative data, and results are presented taking a gender perspective into account.

4.5.2 Final review framework

The following framework outlines possible evaluation themes, questions and tools to guide the final evaluation process in 2018.

| **Evaluation theme** | **Review questions** | **Sample data gathering tools** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Relevance / appropriateness | To what extent are objectives of the programme still relevant?  Are activities and outputs consistent with the overall goal and intended impact? | Document review  Interviews |
| Effectiveness | To what extent have the stated objectives within the Australian NAP been achieved? | Document review  Interviews |
| Impact | What impact has the Australian NAP had for women in conflict-affected countries?  What positive changes have been achieved across the five themes?  What positive changes have occurred in each implementing agency in relation to policies, programmes and approaches to WPS? | Country case studies  The *Most Significant Change* approach could be used to document these changes within implementing departments and agencies |
| Coherence | Do the government’s policies and approaches to peace, security and humanitarian affairs provide policy coherence with the Australian NAP and the WPS agenda?  Are the policies of all government implementing departments and agencies of relevance to WPS complementary to the Australian NAP?  Are any elements of the work undertaken by various stakeholders contradictory?  What steps can be taken to improve complementarity of work? | Document review  Interviews |

4.5.3 Recommendations

| **Key finding** | **Corresponding recommendations for the Australian Government** |
| --- | --- |
| 15 | Ensure strong linkages between the Australian NAP revision and final review process to ensure the second iteration of the Australian NAP builds on learning highlighted in the final review. |
| 16 | Review, assess and build on the proposed Final Review Framework. |

# 5. Conclusion

Resolution 1325 is the only UNSC resolution that has an annual anniversary. The mobilisation and the global constituency that have developed around the WPS agenda reflect its significance globally, regionally and domestically, in particular in countries affected by conflict and insecurity.

Australia’s first independent interim review of its own *National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2012-2018* has been a significant opportunity to assess its relevance, and ensure that it is the most effective tool it can be to motivate, guide and manage Australia’s implementation of WPS. The interim review found that the Australian NAP provides a sufficient basis for action on WPS. While the Australian Government is currently engaged in a wealth of activity on WPS, a number of gaps and challenges are impeding systematic action on WPS. A strong partnership with sustained engagement between government and civil society will advance Australia’s efforts on WPS.

The findings from this independent interim review are relevant, not only domestically, but also regionally and globally. It is hoped the findings in this report will contribute to a broad discussion and process of learning, reflection and assessment among Australian Government agencies accountable under the Australian NAP, as well as among UN Member States, the UN system, inter-governmental organisations such as NATO, and civil society on the needs, direction, transformative potential, and challenges of the WPS agenda.

Despite the gaps and challenges identified in this interim review, it is clear that the Australian NAP provides a valuable strategic policy framework for action on WPS. It is also clear that the Australian NAP is an important achievement and is still in its infancy. There is agreement that the Australian NAP is a critical first step, establishing a foundation from which to continue building a WPS effort.

In addition to the findings, the process of conducting the interim review has been valuable for progressing the WPS agenda. The coordination with Australian Government agencies and departments, and the interviews in particular, prompted implementing agencies to consider linkages between their work and the Australian NAP that are not at the forefront of their day-to-day work. The process of conducting the Australian NAP review reminded stakeholders of the relevance of the Australian NAP to the broader WPS effort, especially for those working in humanitarian settings, and encouraged information sharing and engagement within departments. It served as a positive opportunity to remind departments of the Australian NAP and the WPS agenda and of their relevance to other government and international policy frameworks and processes.

The 16 findings and their corresponding recommendations provide practical, constructive and achievable insights, which can have a positive impact during the second half of the life of the current Australian NAP and will provide the foundation on which the final review can take place in 2018.

# Appendix A

## Summary of Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security

| **Resolution 1325 (2000):** Addresses the impact of conflict on women and recognises the contribution of women in preventing and resolving conflict and their role in maintaining international peace and security. |
| --- |
| **Resolution 1820 (2008):** Recognises conflict-related sexual violence as a tactic of war used by warring parties to achieve military or political end and resulting in impunity, which requires specialised military and police responses. |
| **Resolution 1888 (2009):** Provides for more effective implementation of Resolution 1820, including by establishing a Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict to provide high-level leadership, and establishing women protection advisers within peacekeeping missions. |
| **Resolution 1889 (2009):** Focuses on post-conflict peacebuilding, includes a strategy for increasing the number of women participating in peace talks, and calls for the development of global indicators to measure the implementation of Resolution 1325 by the UN and Member States. |
| **Resolution 1960 (2010):** Reaffirms the earlier commitments required to address sexual violence in conflict and mandates the creation of tools to combat impunity by listing perpetrators and establishing monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements. |
| **Resolution 2106 (2013):** Requests all actors, including the Security Council, to do more to implement earlier resolutions and to combat impunity for perpetrators of sexual violence in conflict. Acknowledges the importance of civil society, including women’s organisations, in preventing and responding to sexual violence in conflict. |
| **Resolution 2122 (2013):** Sets in place stronger measures to improve women’s participation and representation in conflict resolution, especially through leadership positions. Reaffirms that gender equality is central to achieving international peace and security. Sets out the need for humanitarian aid to ensure access to the full range of sexual and reproductive health services, including for pregnancies resulting from rape. |
| **Resolution 2422 (2015):** Request Member States to increase resourcing for WPS, including through humanitarian assistance. Sets out the need to integrate countering violent extremism into the WPS agenda, as well as women’s role in the prevention of illicit transfer of small arms and light weapon. Calls for women to be a central concern at the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016. |

Source: DFAT 2015

# Appendix B

## Australian NAP high-level strategies

The Australian NAP consists of five high-level strategies and 24 actions allocated to responsible implementing government agencies. The five strategies describe what the Australian Government ‘will do to achieve better outcomes for women and girls against each of the five thematic areas’ (Australian Government 2012, p.19).

The five strategies are:

* Integrate a gender perspective into Australia’s policies on peace and security.
* Embed the Women, Peace and Security agenda in the Australian Government’s approach to human resource management of Defence, Australian Federal Police and deployed personnel.
* Support civil society organisations to promote equality and increase women’s participation in conflict prevention, peace-building, conflict resolution, and relief and recovery.
* Promote Women, Peace and Security implementation internationally.
* Take a coordinated and holistic approach domestically and internationally to Women, Peace and Security (Australian Government 2012, p.19).

# Appendix C

## M&E Framework of the Australian NAP (2012-2018)

| **STRATEGY 1: *INTEGRATE A GENDER PERSPECTIVE INTO AUSTRALIA’S POLICIES ON PEACE AND SECURITY*** |  |
| --- | --- |
| **MEASURES** | **AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE** |
| 1. Number, title and description of relevant official policy and guidance documents that contain reference to the Women, Peace and Security agenda or resolutions 1325, 1820, 1888, 1889 and 1960. | Defence, AFP, AusAID |
| **STRATEGY 2: *EMBED THE WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA IN THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT’S APPROACH TO HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT OF DEFENCE, AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE AND DEPLOYED PERSONNEL*** |  |
| **MEASURES** | **AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE** |
| 1. Number and percentage of Australian military, police and civilian personnel deployed in operations that have received training on Women, Peace and Security (including their responsibilities under UNSCR 1325, 1820, 1888, 1889 and 1960), and a description of that training. | Defence, AFP, DFAT, AusAID |
| 1. Number of women and men employed by the Australian Federal Police, Australian Defence Force and Department of Defence, disaggregated by department and level. | AFP, Defence |
| 1. Number of Australian Government employees deployed and posted to conflict and post-conflict settings disaggregated by sex, department and level. | Defence, AFP, AusAID, DFAT |
| 1. The number of reported cases of sexual exploitation and abuse allegedly perpetrated by Australian Government employees deployed to conflict and/or post conflict settings reported to Australian and host government agencies. | Defence, AFP, AusAID |
| **STRATEGY 3: *SUPPORT CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS TO PROMOTE EQUALITY AND INCREASE WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN CONFLICT PREVENTION, PEACE-BUILDING, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND RELIEF AND RECOVERY*** |  |
| **MEASURES** | **AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE** |
| 1. Description of civil society activities funded by the Australian Government that pertain to Women, Peace and Security. | AusAID, FaHCSIA |
| 1. Description of approaches taken by the Australian Government to share information with civil society on the Women, Peace and Security agenda. | FaHCSIA, Defence, AFP, DFAT, ACMC |
| 1. Description of domestic educational activities that relate to the promotion of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. | FaHCSIA, AFP, ACMC |

Continued over page

| **STRATEGY 4: *PROMOTE WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY IMPLEMENTATION INTERNATIONALLY*** |  |
| --- | --- |
| **MEASURES** | **AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE** |
| 1. Description of international assistance provided for activities pertaining to Women, Peace and Security. | AusAID, Defence, DFAT, ACMC, AGD |
| 1. Description of strategies employed by the ADF and AFP to facilitate the engagement and protection of local women in peace and security efforts. | Defence, AFP |
| 1. Description of peace processes in which Australia has played a prominent role. | DFAT |
| 1. Description of institution-building strategies Australia has been involved in that promote Women, Peace and Security. | AusAID, AFP, Defence |
| 1. Number and description of interventions and support of resolutions and policy in the UN Security Council, General Assembly, UN Human Rights Council and other relevant fora addressing Women, Peace and Security issues. | DFAT, FaHCSIA |
| 1. Description of initiatives to contribute to the development of best practice guidance on issues relating to Women, Peace and Security. | DFAT, AusAID, Defence, FaHCSIA, ACMC |
| 1. List of Australian women and men in senior UN decision-making positions relating to peace and security. | DFAT, Defence |
| **STRATEGY 5: *TAKE A CO-ORDINATED AND HOLISTIC APPROACH DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY TO WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY*** |  |
| **MEASURES** | **AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE** |
| 1. Number and key outcomes of Australian Government inter-departmental meetings that address the Women, Peace and Security agenda. | FaHCSIA |

Source: Australian Government 2012, p. 28-29

# Appendix D

## Interim Review: Scope

The Commonwealth Approach to Market (ATM) – Consultancy Services (Reference PMC 003904) outlined the following detailed scope for the Interim Review:

* Track whole of government progress on the implementation of the Actions under the NAP, including:
  + identifying gaps and what is not working well in the implementation of the Actions’ tasks;
  + analysing the relevance of the Actions under the NAP against the intended outcomes of the NAP; and
  + analysing the relevance of the NAP to inform actions to implement the WPS Agenda more broadly.
* Assess the extent to which the NAP’s current framework, actions and processes can sustain a final assessment of the effectiveness of the NAP.
* Build the evaluation framework for the Final Review, including:
  + identifying opportunities to strengthen baseline data to support future evaluation efforts, particularly moving from quantitative reporting to qualitative analysis; and
  + proposing principles and questions for an evaluation framework for the NAP to be able to measure what differences have been made over the life of the NAP.
* Assess the NAP’s capacity to address new and emerging issues in the WPS Agenda.
  + These issues need to be identified for current and future attention in the context of the actions already embedded in the NAP.
* Consider the critical role of civil society and the collaboration of government agencies with civil society organisations to the successful implementation of the strategies under the NAP, including an assessment of the relationships and frameworks for consultation in these areas.
* Consult with the NAP participating government agencies:
  + Office for Women, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C);
  + Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (including staff in UNNY and Geneva UN);
  + Australian Defence;
  + Australian Civil-Military Centre;
  + Australian Federal Police; and
  + Attorney-General’s Department.
* Consult with relevant civil society representatives to capture the experiences of women from conflict backgrounds now living in Australia.
* Consider publicly available documentation, together with the most recently available information on WPS obtained through consultations and discussions with relevant regional and international organisations and research institutions.

# Appendix E

## Interviews

The researchers carried out 24 interviews. Of this total number of interviews, 15 were face-to-face interviews and eight were phone or Skype interviews. Of the face-to-face interviews, two were group interviews and the remaining 13 were individual interviews. Included in the total number was written feedback received by one additional civil society stakeholder who was unavailable to be interviewed, a brief interview with an additional representative from Defence focused on a specific area, and a phone interview with the WPS Coordinator in the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Departments, agencies and organisations interviewed

| **Government** | **Civil society** | **Other** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Australian Federal Police Department of Defence  Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade   * Gender Equality Branch * Humanitarian Policy and Partnerships Section * Humanitarian Response Branch * Stablilisation and recovery Branch * International Organisations Branch * Pacific Division * Afghanistan Section * Burma Section   Office for Women, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet | ActionAid  Australian National University Gender Institute  Diaspora Action Australia  International Women’s Development Agency (IWDA)  JERA International Monash University  University of New South Wales University of South Australia  Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) Australia | Independent consultants  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherland |

# Appendix F

## Limitations of the methodology

1. **Participation in interviews:** There was uneven participation from Australian NAP implementing government agencies and key representatives. In one instance, an agency requested to not be interviewed, which limited the perspectives of an entire department.
2. **Online civil society survey**: The researchers sent out a brief online survey to civil society stakeholders specifically on theme 4 (collaboration). Recognising how diverse and disparate civil society is, this was deemed a useful way of reaching a wider spectrum of civil society actors, beyond those civil society experts being interviewed. The aim was to seek practical suggestions and insights about collaboration with the Australian Government on Australian NAP implementation. The survey was sent out to more than 300 people through various civil society networks and was pushed out through social media; however only 17 people provided responses. Given the small uptake, the responses were considered insufficient to provide valid data.
3. **Limitations of interviews**: Some interviews, including with key government and civil society stakeholders and with representatives from other NAP countries, were not possible during the time period. Although the interviews were intended to validate findings from the document review, they became a significant source of information themselves, suggesting that a wider range of interviews might have enhanced this data source.
4. **Intent of the** Australian **NAP**: The lack of a clear definition of the overall goal and objectives of the Australian NAP was raised by many civil society representatives interviewed and came out as an issue in the comparative analysis of other NAPs. The importance of having an overall goal and objectives to be measured in terms of relevance should not be understated. The lack of an overall goal and higher-level objectives has limited the analysis of the interim review.

# Appendix G

## Learning from other non-conflict donor NAP countries

| **Country**  **NAP**  **revisions** | **Relevance to WPS agenda** | **M&E** | **Gaps and challenges** | **Civil Society (CS) – government collaboration** | **Good practice** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Austria**  2007,  2012-16 | * Revision content overlaps with Austrian National Action Plan on Combating Human Trafficking and the Strategic Guideline on Security and Development (in which UNSC resolutions 1325 and 1820 are fields of action) | * Report to parliament * Working Group meetings held to monitor implementation, with annual report forwarded to parliament * NAP effectiveness to be reviewed in 2016 | * No lessons identified in revision | * Revision expanded monitoring role of CS * CS involved in reviewing NAP with Inter-Ministerial WG * WG meet CS at least once/year * CS comment on annual implementation report * NAP effectiveness to be reviewed in 2016 in cooperation with CS | * Policy coherence across related areas |
| **Belgium**  2009-12,  2013-16 | * Includes specific focus on women and children in relation to the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons    | * Progress report developed by government, presented to CS and discussed at conference in 2011 * In response to increasing demand for measurability, revision includes a ‘control mechanism consisting of instruments for operational monitoring’ * Identify possibility that monitoring instruments may be refined to better monitor impact * Annual report to parliament | * Financial allocation not specified | * CS shadow reports are formal part of monitoring mechanisms * CS working group involved in evaluation process of 1st NAP | * New structure to reflect current priorities of government * Revised NAP has clearer lines of actions |
| **Denmark**  2005-8,  2008-13,  2014-19 | * 1st NAP strongly protection-focused, revisions based on deliberate attention to balanced approach between protection and participation * Detailed, concrete actions identified as important in 2nd revision | * Review reported to parliament * Revisions include strengthened M&E, including systematic monitoring by inter-ministry working group | * The 2005 NAP was not monitored comprehensively | * Actions specific to CS are included | * Revised NAP includes section on ‘Achievements and Lessons Learned 2005-2007’ * Danish National Police included in 1st revision and expanded upon in 2nd revision |
| **Finland**  2008-11,  2012-16 | * WPS considered holistically, including climate change, health and education as relevant elements of WPS agenda | * Revision includes greater focus on monitoring and reporting * Annual progress report to parliament * Lesson learned from 1st NAP: the need for collection, evaluation and distribution of lessons learned * Conducted case studies from Kenya, Nepal and North- East India as part of ‘Implementation Study’ of 1st NAP[[27]](#footnote-27) | * Identifies need for more long-term research on effectiveness * Implementation of ambitious targets lags behind * Coordination between bilateral actions and Finnish efforts at the multilateral level is required * Coherence between the stated objectives and financial resources is a challenge. | * CS and research institutions are members of inter-ministerial monitoring Follow-up Group that has regular meetings several times/year | * Conducted ‘twinning’ or formal engagement with Kenya/ Afghanistan to exchange lessons learned and experiences about their respective NAPs |
| **Iceland**  2008,  2013-16 | * Revision is linked to the Strategy for Iceland’s international development co-operation (adopted in 2013) | * Revised document identifies measures for accountability and monitoring * Revision standardises reporting across four UN-identified thematic pillars * Four main objectives identified, which are partnered with expected outcomes, activities, and indicators | * No lessons identified in revision | * CS were consulted in the draft, no mention of on-going engagement | * ‘Living document’ provisions allow for adjustments and revision on ongoing basis * Provides estimation of total annual cost of implementation of the NAP |
| **Ireland**  2011-14,  2015-18 | * Mid-Term progress report on 1st NAP called for fewer and broader commitments in Ireland’s second NAP | * Monitoring group meets four times a year and is independently chaired * Revision strengthens the monitoring and evaluation * Indicators are more impact-oriented * Includes some actions aimed at building an evidence base on the impact of NAP implementation[[28]](#footnote-28) * Irish Defence Forces adopted its own implementation plan | * Mid-term progress report observed limited knowledge among implementing actors about work of NAP colleagues and recommended regular meetings outside of the Monitoring Group * Mid-Term Progress Report highlights challenges in implementation | * Monitoring group is 50% CS * Six members of the Consultative Group that advised and informed development of revised NAP were from CS, including diaspora organisations * Outreach to diaspora communities is a core action in the NAP | * Findings of independent mid- term progress report published (not common) * NAP recognised as a living document |
| **Italy**  2010-13,  2014-16 | * Identifies current economic crisis as an emerging issue * Focuses on integrated approach, including recognition of economic issues * Revision widens the scope of action of stakeholders in response to expansion of agenda (UNSCR 2106 and 2122) | * Unlike 1st NAP, government will submit report at the end of first year of revised NAP identifying the areas that need to be strengthened, especially following consultations with both civil society and the Parliament | * No mention of allocated funding to implement the NAP | * The inter-Ministerial Working Group commits to more inclusive dialogue with NGOs and participation of CS | * Connection between empowerment and combating violence against women to be a focus of Italy’s UNSC term 2017/18 |
| **Netherlands**  2008-11,  2012-15 | * 1st NAP had wide scope (19 goals and 72 activities) while revision was narrowed to focus on a single overarching goal: ‘women’s leadership and political participation fragile states, conflict and post-conflict areas and transition countries’ * Revision shifted toward greater flexibility with detailed plan intentionally left out to enable responsiveness to changing environments * Flexible approach partnered with ‘tailored priority actions’ developed by country focus groups, based on the geographic focus areas in the NAP | * Report to parliament * More flexible revision paired with ‘stricter’ M&E framework that incorporates both quantitative measures of the results of collaboration between NAP signatories and qualitative M&E of the outcome and impact of the NAP using innovative participatory techniques | * First NAP had a lack of an appropriate evaluation mechanisms * Even with more refined and complex M&E framework, confusion persists about what they should be measuring * Strategic relationship between implementing agencies and research institutions requires clarification | * Only NAP in which civil society is a co-signatory: a total of 57 civil society signatories, at last count * Good practice identified: cooperation between signatories should be flexible and ad-hoc * CS shadow reports are formal part of monitoring mechanisms * Local women and women’s organisations are central to Dutch approach to NAP implementation; they consider’ local women and women’s organisations in fragile states, conflict and post-conflict areas and transition countries as key stakeholders in the plan. They are the main ‘owners’ of the process’ | * Revision includes overview of commitments in financial and/or human resources across the four years of the NAP. Commitment of human resources is described by the number of hours given to 1325 activities |
| **Norway**  2006,  2011-13,  2015-18 | * Considers WPS holistically, linking the agenda to health and education efforts * Sexual violence is identified as a cross-cutting issue | * Identifies desired outcomes * Revisions include results framework and indicators to enhance M&E * Annual work plan developed to complement the NAP and specify important action points for the coming year and milestones * External review of government’s implementation * Rather than specify funding in the NAP they explain how funds will be earmarked for WPS within the existing budgetary framework[[29]](#footnote-29) | * Calls for closer coordination and cooperation between all actors | * Emphasise cooperation between government, NGOs and research groups * CS and academia/research institutions meet inter-ministerial monitoring working group twice/year * Considered a ‘pioneer’ in its engagement with and integration of research institutes | * ‘Living document’ provisions allow for adjustments and revision on ongoing basis * Identifies annual budget allocation for WPS |
| **Portugal**  2009-13,  2014-18 | * Notes relevance of WPS agenda for ‘peaceful countries’ as well as conflict-affected countries | * M&E framework includes outcome indicators and timeframe * Interim assessments conducted * Implementing agencies required to develop NAP annual work plans * Working group meets twice a year | * Does not commit allocated funding | * Revision aims to strengthen cooperation with CS, particularly regarding assessment of revised NAP * NAP working group meets with CS twice/year | * Revised NAP drawn from recommendations of independent external evaluation of 1st NAP * Revised NAP calls for independent external evaluation at end of its term (same as in 1st NAP) |
| **Sweden**  2006-8,  2009-16 | * Revision broader in scope than 1st NAP: expanded to encompass UNSC resolution 1820 | * Revision includes strengthened M&E * Reviews are conducted during annual meetings led by government * Both reporting on and financing for the NAP are to be covered by existing processes | * Need to increase national knowledge of, cooperation and exchange of experiences regarding Resolution 1325 * Knowledge sharing between international actors | * Swedish NGOs are mentioned in regard to being consulted. * CS presence at annual review meeting | * ‘Living document’ provisions allow for adjustments and revision on ongoing basis * Identified importance of engaging with other NAP actors, noting its aim ‘for more systematic exchanges of knowledge, experience and information between international actors’ |
| **Switzerland**  2007,  2010-12,  2013-16 | * Unique 3-year time frame * Revision includes promotion of dialogue with armed non-state actors to combat gender-based violence, and multilateral efforts to protect the sexual and reproductive rights of victims * Revision identifies link between protection of civilians strategy and NAP goals * Revision makes links to small arms strategy | * Working Group meets at least once a year * Annual progress report based on individual reports from relevant agencies * Catalogue of measures valid for maximum four years | * Annual progress reports contain implementation recommendations * Progress reports recommended further development of synergy between NAP and thematic/ geographical strategies of the federal administration | * Unlike 1st NAP, CS involved in development of revisions and continues to be consulted in revision/ implementation processes | * ‘Living document’ provisions allow for adjustments and revision on ongoing basis * Revisions outline procedure for adding new measures to NAP * Understanding of changes to NAP is made available to public through awareness activities and measures |
| **UK**  2006,  2010-13,  2014-17 | * 2nd revision highlights role of men and boys as guiding principle * UK NAP identifies five discrete outcomes, which are broken down into outputs aligned with actions * NAP complemented by detail outlined in implementation plan | * NAP is reviewed annually * Progress reported to parliament * Emphasis on building a WPS evidence base which is intended to ‘establish baseline data and indicators to measure progress against outcomes’ in six focus countries: Afghanistan, Burma, DRC, Libya, Somalia and Syria * Under each country, actions are aligned against baseline data from 2014 and targets set for 2017 * Allocation of specific funding for external M&E to establish and monitor baseline data and improve evidence base * WPS integrated into Conflict, Stability and Security Fund: ‘We will not specify a dedicated allocation of resources to [WPS] work – this only discourages attempts to integrate gender into everything we do’ | * 1st revision identified gap in NAP to address wide range of work undertaken by government networks | * Revisions have seen expanding collaboration with CS * CS member of monitoring group * CS and academia involved in drafting of revisions * GAPS CS network and the Associate Parliamentary Group on Women, Peace and Security organised focus group discussions with CS organisations, academia, government and parliamentarians, in UK and in three focus countries (DRC, Afghanistan and Nepal) as part of annual review process in 2011 leading to 2012 revision | * NAP actions are focused on conflict-affected countries * Identifies that NAP cannot be a static document and must remain responsive * 2nd revision contains several short case studies and examples of initiatives |

Sources: APG and GAPS 2011; Commission for Citizenship and Gender Equality 2014; Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 2013; Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs 2012; Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2014a, b; Government of Ireland 2015; Government of Sweden 2012; Hinds & McMinn 2013; Jukarainen & Puumala 2014; Kingdom of Belgium 2013; Kool 2014; Mäki-Rahkola 2011; Meijenfeldt et al. 2013; Miller, Pournik & Swaine 2014; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Danish Ministry of Defence & Danish National Police 2008, 2014; Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2013; Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2012; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2012; Nagarajan & Tielemans 2013; Norwegian Ministries 2015; UN Women 2012; WILPF 2014.

# Appendix H

## Case study of progress on institutionalisation of the Australian NAP: Defence

Defence’s progress on institutionalisation is a good example of best practice and is at the forefront of Australian NAP implementation in the Australian Government. The high-level focal point is the Director National Action Plan for Women, Peace and Security (DNAPWPS). This position reports directly to the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) and represents the CDF on the IDWG. According to a directive by the Chief of the Defence Force, this position is mandated to:

***Work across Defence to coordinate and champion the implementation of the Defence-related [Australian] NAP strategies and actions, and ensure that Defence adheres to the timeline directed by the Australian Government for Progress Report activities…The DNAWPS is to monitor, coordinate and report progress of all 17 Defence-related [Australian] NAP actions and reinforce Defence’s commitment to the WPS agenda in the broader Australian community, and to ensure that internally, Defence personnel gain an understanding of, and commitment to, the role of women in Australia’s peace and security efforts (Chief of the Defence Force 2014, p. 2)***

The DNAPWPS is supported by two gender advisors with full-time WPS responsibilities in Canberra, in Joint Operations Command and Army Operations. There is also a full-time WPS advisor at the Australian National Headquarters in Al-Minhad in the Middle East Area of Operations. Australian NAP implementation is further supported by a Gender Focal Point in the Military Commitments Branch, an Air Force Gender Advisor and Navy Women's Strategic Advisor (both focused specifically on participation of women), as well as representatives from other sections of Defence who support and help coordinate implementation through membership in the Defence WPS Working Group (Department of Defence n.d.).

‘Gender Advisors such as Captain Wittwer, are essential to ensuring the effective implementation of UNSCR 1325.’

Senator Michaelia Cash

(Cash 2014a)

The Defence Implementation Plan (DIP) itemises detailed tasks, including a task lead, integrated M&E measures, timeframe (unlike the Australian NAP), and the tracking of progress on the tasks.[[30]](#footnote-30) The DNAPWPS is responsible for updating the DIP. The DIP has been adapted into a service-specific implementation plan for the Air Force and a Joint Operations Command implementation plan.

A Defence-wide Working Group, chaired by the DNAPWPS, is made up of representatives from the Services and relevant groups and meets quarterly to report progress. The high-level focal point is responsible for all internal reporting, which is required on a six-monthly basis, as well as external reporting to the IDWG and through the biennial progress reports. According to the DNAPWPS, the Working Group has been an ‘important factor in accountability and ownership of Australian NAP actions by the Service Chiefs and Defence Group Heads’ (Wittwer 2015, p. 359).

Despite progress on institutionalisation, one interviewee emphasised that demonstrations of commitment vary within the department. For instance, the Chief of Joint Operations and the Chief of Air Force have issued directives demonstrating publicly their commitment to the Australian NAP. The other Service Chiefs have not.

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1. See Appendix A [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Sources: DFAT 2015; Australian Government 2014 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations was presented to the UN Secretary-General on 16 June 2015 by the High-Level Panel on Peace Operations and can be accessed at <[http://www.un.org/sg/pdf/HIPPO\_Report\_1\_June\_2015.pdf>;](http://www.un.org/sg/pdf/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf%3e;) and the Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture was presented to the Secretary-General in June 2015 and can be accessed at <<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/69/968>>. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. United Nations press release (2015, 13 October) ‘Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2242 (2015) to Improve Implementation of Landmark Text on Women, Peace, Security Agenda’. Available at http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12076.doc.htm [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The Responsibility to Protect is a proposed norm that sovereignty is not an absolute right, and that states forfeit aspects of their sovereignty when they fail to protect their populations from mass atrocity crimes and human rights violations (namely genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. The Relief and Recovery pillar focuses on ensuring that relief needs specific to women and girls are met and that special attention is paid to the most vulnerable; and calls for efforts to ensure women's active participation is central to all relief and recovery efforts. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. For a summary of the Asia Pacific Consultations undertaken for the Global Study on Women, Peace and Security, see <<http://wps.unwomen.org/en/highlights/asia-pacific-civil-society-consultation>>. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. For more information, see <[http://wps.unwomen.org/en/highlights/asia-pacific-civil-society-consultation>.](http://wps.unwomen.org/en/highlights/asia-pacific-civil-society-consultation%3e.) [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. While review theme 3 is focused specifically on gaps and challenges related to implementation of the NAP actions, gaps and challenges related to monitoring and evaluation and civil society collaboration are addressed separately under the respective review themes. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. See Appendix A. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. The full impact of this flexible approach will not be clear, however, until a comprehensive final evaluation of the NAP is conducted. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. The NAP uses the term ‘measure’ to refer to the indicators in the M&E framework. To avoid repeated use of ‘measure’ where the word is also used as a verb, ‘indicator’ is used interchangeably where necessary. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Concern was first raised about the M&E framework in the initial civil society response to the first consultation draft of the NAP in 2011. These concerns included that the M&E framework lacked ‘clear targets, timeframes, indicators, precise language and baseline data, all of which are crucial to ensuring that the NAP would be effectively implemented and measured’ (McKay et al. 2011, p.1). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. One exception is measure 5a, which seeks to capture key outcomes of the meetings of the Inter-departmental measuring and attributing impact Working Group on WPS. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. The OECD DAC Evaluation criteria for impact is ‘the positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended’ (OECD n.d.). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. According to the OECD, outputs are defined as ‘The products, capital goods and services which result from a

    development intervention; may also include changes resulting from the intervention which are relevant to the achievement of outcomes’. Outcome is defined as ‘The likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention’s outputs (OECD 2002). [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Two interviewees from DFAT highlighted that this information can be captured at an individual program level – through the gender equality criteria in DFAT’s Aid Quality Check and Humanitarian Response Aid Quality Check – however they noted this information does not feed into higher level NAP reporting. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. The AFP training example cited in Table 3 is followed in the 2014 Progress Report by a note providing some qualitative assessment of the activity, with reference to a detailed post-course assessment ‘currently being developed to ensure that participants take their learning in this area seriously and to contribute to ongoing training improvements’ (Australian Government 2014, p. 19). A similar approach is recommended in the independent mid-term progress report on Ireland’s NAP (2011-2014), in which the authors recommended more attention to monitoring and evaluation of training to ensure it is effective and relevant. The authors identified a number of avenues for assessing effectiveness of the training in relation to deployments: monitoring by training staff, mission debriefs and after action reviews (Hinds and McMinn 2013, p. 15). [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. ‘The goals set forth in this National Action Plan are the beginning, rather than the end, of effecting real and meaningful change. As directed by the Executive Order, within 150 days, State, [Department of Defence (DoD)], and [US Agency for International Development (USAID)] will designate one or more officer or officers, as appropriate, as responsible for coordination and implementation, and will supplement this Plan by submitting to the Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor agency-specific Women, Peace, and Security implementation plans. These implementation plans will establish a full range of time-bound, measurable, and resourced actions State, DoD, and USAID will take to realize their commitments, and will include meaningful strategies for monitoring implementation and evaluating results’ (The White House 2011, p. 23). [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Some of the WPS work that predates the NAP is evidenced in the former AusAID publication ‘Women, Peace and Security: AusAID’s implementation of Resolution 1325 (AusAID 2010). [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. According to the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) policy brief (2015) on *Financing UN Security Council Resolution 1325: Aid in support of gender equality and women’s rights in fragile contexts* only 6 per cent of aid to fragile states and economies (in 2012-13) targeted gender equality as the principal objective (OECD DAC Network on Gender Equality 2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. In specific terms, the UN Secretary General has requested all donor member states to adopt the UN’s target of earmarking 15 per cent of all aid flows to crisis and conflict contexts to address women’s needs and further gender equality, as well as better mainstreaming of gender into the other 85 per cent – and to track, monitor and evaluate these targets (UN Secretary General 2014). This has been supported by the Global Civil Society Roadmap (NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security 2015), the findings from the global civil society inputs to the Global Study (PeaceWomen 2015) and the recommendations in the Global Study on WPS (Coomoraswamy 2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. See <[http://www.lse.ac.uk/WomenPeaceSecurity/Home.aspx>.](http://www.lse.ac.uk/WomenPeaceSecurity/Home.aspx%3e.) [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. This OECD DAC research was launched at an event supported by the Australian Mission to the United Nations in March 2015, during the 59th Commission on the Status of Women (CSW),

    indicating the government’s recognition of this issue. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. A similar point was made in the 2014 study of NAPs in the OSCE region, in which the author stated that it is ‘imperative to establish clear rules explaining how cooperation should be conducted' (Ormhaug 2014, p.10). [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Civil society is also an implementing actor in the Pacific Regional Action Plan (Pacific Islands Forum 2012). [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Also, the civil society network Finnish 1325 Network conducted a desk-based study of the implementation of Resolution 1325 by Nordic countries in the policy and activities regarding Afghanistan (Mäki-Rahkola 2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. For example, one action calls for gathering baseline data ‘via the implementation of pre- and post-deployment surveys for relevant civilian and military staff and incorporate impact statements on Women, Peace and Security issues in post deployment surveys’ (Government of Ireland 2015, p. 21). [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. The NAP states that ‘Financing, together with diplomacy and work at political level, are the most important tools for implementing the women, peace and security agenda throughout the ministries’ work’ (Norwegian Ministries 2015, p. 45). [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. The DIP is unclassified and available upon request as required for any work-related purposes. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)