The Reviewers express their appreciation to:
- The intelligence agencies and their officers for their complete and courteous cooperation throughout this Review
- The people and organisations who provided submissions or participated in interviews – their contributions and insights have been most helpful, and
- The members of the Review Secretariat for their professional, competent, conscientious and dedicated assistance.
[1] Note: the Flood Inquiry did not include the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
[2] Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies (the Flood Report), July 2004, page 6
[3] Sir David Omand, ‘Securing the State’, page 22
[4] Allan Gyngell, ‘The Challenges of Intelligence’, speech to the Lowy Institute for International Policy, 30 March 2011
[5] ‘Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States’ (the Rockefeller Commission), June 1975, page 6
[6] Martin T Bimfort, ‘A definition of Intelligence’, released by the CIA Historical Review Program, 18 September 1995
[7] Sir David Omand, ‘Securing the State’, page 22
[8] www.fbi.gov/about-us/intelligence/defined
[9] Australian Defence Force Academy: Oxford Companion to Australian Military History
[10] See definitions of ‘security’ and ‘foreign intelligence’ in section 4 of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Commonwealth) and ASIO functions set out in section 17(1) of the Act
[11] Flood Report, pages 6-7
[12] We set out in greater detail what we think are reasonable expectations of intelligence in Appendix 1
[13] Nomination of LTGEN James Clapper, Jr, Hearing before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, 20 July 2010, page 9
[14] Address by Jonathan Evans to the Worshipful Company of Security Professionals, 18 September 2010
[15] ASIS was initially established through the mechanism of Executive Council minutes which formally empowered the Australian Government, under sections 61 and 67 of the Constitution, to form a secret intelligence service
[16] The latter part of the sentence attributed to Fairfax CEO Greg Hywood in ‘The Diary’ , The Australian, 25 April 2011, page 27
[17] In Appendix 2 we set in greater detail our logic for maintaining the current structure of the AIC
[18] In Appendix 3 we set our justification for this view more fully
[19] Speech by Allan Gyngell to the Lowy Institute, 30 March 2011, page 9
[20] Address by Jonathan Evans to the Worshipful Company of Security Professionals, 18 September 2010
[21] Nassim Nicholas Taleb and Mark Blyth, ‘The Black Swan of Cairo: How Suppressing Volatility Makes the World Less Predictable and More Dangerous’, Foreign Affairs, Volume 90, No 3, pages 35–36
[22] ‘Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States’, June 1975, page 2
[23] Porter J Goss quoted in ‘Strategic Intelligence, Volume 2’, page 136
[24] Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security, Third Report, page 10
[25] Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security, Third Report, pages 120-121
[26] Hope Report, page 121
[27] Elaine Kamarck, John F Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, ‘Applying 21st Century Government to the Challenge of Homeland Security’ June 2002, page 19
[28] Elaine Kamarck, page 20
[29] Irwin Cotler, Address to the Fifth Meeting of Ministers of Justice or of Ministers or Attorneys-General of the Americas, 28 April, 2004
[30] Irwin Cotler, Evidence given to the Proceedings of the Special Senate Committee on the Anti-Terrorism Act, Ottawa, 21 February 2005
[31] (2006) VSCA 165