The structure of the Australian intelligence community
The organisational structure of the Australian Intelligence Community has been based upon two principles designed to ensure its integrity, objectivity and effectiveness:
- The separation of what can be broadly categorised as collection agencies and analytic agencies: Collection focused agencies do make analytic contributions, undertake analysis to guide their collection and use other sources in this analytic work. The important point about this distinction is that there is a second agency whose exclusive task is to apply its specialist analytic capabilities to all sources of information and to do this work at one step removed from the collection effort, and
- The separation of security and foreign intelligence efforts.
The one exception to the operation of these principles is the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. ASIO:
- Conducts its security intelligence operations principally in Australia but also overseas, and
- Collects and assesses intelligence on security issues.
The rationale for this exception is that threats to Australia’s security can arise at home or abroad and separating the collection of security intelligence could compromise ASIO’s central operational tasks, far outweighing any gain in the objectivity of its assessments.
It has been said that the structure and operation of our intelligence agencies reflects an out-of-date Cold War model. This Review does not agree with that opinion. We consider that the original logic for the current arrangements remains strong and there is no need for any change in the basic structure of the Australian Intelligence Community.
Separating collection from assessment
The separation between intelligence collection and assessment accords with the recommendations made in the Hope Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security and has stood the test of time. The Royal Commissioner found that, if intelligence assessments are to be accepted as objective, ‘intelligence producers and the intelligence assessment process must be independent and be seen to be independent’[24].
Justice Hope said:
‘The national assessment organisation should be separate from the collection agencies. The appearance and the dangers of a large, all-embracing central secret intelligence organisation, with collectors and assessors tending to support each other within the enclosed confines of the organisation must be avoided. The acceptability of assessments produced by such an agency could well be reduced, and people of high calibre might be deterred from association with the new assessment organisation’[25].
We accept the soundness of Justice Hope’s arguments and believe that they are as applicable today as they were at the time of his Royal Commission.
While different options are available for structuring this community, we accept that the optimal approach for Australia in managing its security machinery, given its federal structure and the history and culture of our particular government agencies, is likely to be based on a number of smaller, nimble, well connected organisations rather than fewer large organisations.
We also argue that there is considerable advantage in the structure of the Australian Intelligence Community agencies aligning well with our international counterparts. The similarity in their activities, functions and responsibilities facilitates joint operations, knowledge and capability transfers, effective staff exchanges and the embedding of liaison officers with similar training, skills and tradecraft. Given how important this collaboration is to the overall effectiveness of our intelligence effort, there is significant merit in retaining a structure that meshes neatly with our major intelligence partners.
Separation of domestic security intelligence and foreign intelligence
Some people argue that, in the globalised Information Age, it is artificial and hinders effectiveness to maintain the distinction between domestic security and foreign intelligence.
Justice Hope set out the original justification for this distinction very clearly when he wrote:
‘The domestic collection capacity should be institutionally separate from the foreign collectors. The constraints within which the domestic agency should and must work, and its obligations of propriety, are fundamentally different from those of the foreign agencies. The demarcation should not be blurred, or be seen to be blurred’[26].
Today, as a result, Australia’s foreign intelligence collectors are subject to different regulatory regimes than ASIO in its security functions. While there are effective oversight and authorisation arrangements in place that regulate the foreign intelligence agencies, those agencies are not subject to the more stringent legislative regime appropriate to ASIO’s security activities.
As a general proposition, this Review is of the opinion that it would unnecessarily complicate the activities of a foreign intelligence agency and its legal compliance if it was to have security intelligence powers and functions comparable to ASIO’s powers and functions in addition to its existing foreign intelligence responsibilities.
Equally, it is important to the protection of the rights of Australians that ASIO’s culture and practices are shaped by an unambiguous legal and ethical framework which balances individual rights with national security concerns.
Ultimately, the important point of the domestic security and foreign intelligence distinction is not to do with the sphere of operation. It is based on the fact that significant rights and protections are afforded to citizens, residents and the general public in Australia and that different checks and balances apply to the security and foreign intelligence regimes.
Therefore, even if over time technology and globalisation require a weakening or elimination of the distinction between spheres of operation, the basic principles that separate agencies dealing with security and intelligence concerning Australian citizens and agencies dealing with citizens of other countries remain sound.
Other means to achieve more effective integration
The only – or at least the principal – remaining purpose in merging or restructuring agencies must be to obtain more effective and efficient performance of their functions. However, this outcome can be achieved by other means.
For example, it has been said that structures are one thing, how well they are joined up and work together is another. What is needed is to develop and build on proposals for more effective coordination among agencies, and to identify and address any legislative, technical or cultural obstacles to the integrated delivery of intelligence and security.
A similar conclusion was reached by Elaine Kamarck of the John F Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in an article she wrote about the American experience with homeland security entitled ‘Applying 21st Century Government to the Challenge of Homeland Security’. Ms Kamarck said:
‘The initial instinct to create one agency to deal with a problem as broad as homeland security is inadequate to the task at hand[27]. The problem of homeland security ... does not fit in one box. To the student of 21st century government, the question is not “Where do the boxes fit on the chart?” but “How do they operate and how do they communicate with each other”’[28]?
Over the last few years, the intelligence agencies have conscientiously worked to achieve more coordinated intelligence outcomes within their existing structures by, among other things, the development of coordination or cooperation centres, shared training and facilities and so on.
Some brief details of three examples of this coordination and cooperation are set out below. They are the Counter-Terrorism Control Centre, the Cyber Security Operations Centre and the National Threat Assessment Centre.
Counter-Terrorism Control Centre
The CTCC was established in accordance with the 2010 Counter-Terrorism White Paper to coordinate terrorism intelligence and investigative activities at the operational and tactical level.
- The CTCC is responsible for:
- Setting and managing counter-terrorism priorities
- Identifying intelligence requirements, and
- Ensuring the processes of collecting and distributing CT information are fully harmonised and effective.
The CTCC has the following members: ASIO (Chair), ASIS, DSD, DIGO and the AFP. It is located within ASIO.
Cyber Security Operations Centre
The CSOC commenced operation within DSD in January 2010. It coordinates and assists with operational responses to cyber events of national importance. The Centre provides government with a consolidated understanding of the cyber threat through its intrusion detection, analytic and threat assessment capabilities.
The CSOC will in due course include a continuously staffed watch office and analysis team, which has the following members: DSD (lead agency), the ADF, DIO, ASIO, the AFP, DSTO and the Attorney-General’s Department.
National Threat Assessment Centre
The NTAC is a 24/7 threat analysis and assessment centre set up in ASIO in 2003.
The NTAC analyses terrorist threats to Australian interests overseas and terrorist threats and threats from violent protests in Australia. The Centre provides threat assessments and country reports on the planning of attacks abroad – which informs DFAT travel advisories – and threats to high office holders and significant events to inform protective security measures.
The Centre, which is chaired by ASIO, comprises all AIC members plus the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the AFP, the Office of Transport Security and the NSW Police.
There have also been improvements in IT connectivity and the sharing of corporate and back office functions between the three Defence intelligence agencies along with a number of other initiatives.
As a result of these considerations, this Review is of the opinion that there is no need to consider any significant restructure of the existing agencies at present although the agencies will have to consider carefully how they will adapt in response to the future challenges they face within those existing structures and cooperation arrangements.