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Guiding recommendation: Build and maintain coordinated national public health emergency communication mechanisms to deliver timely, tailored and effective communications, utilising strong regional, local and community connections.
Successful communication can mitigate some of the more harmful aspects of a pandemic; unsuccessful communication can lead to an irreversible loss of trust in government and uncontrolled spread of a virus.
COVID‑19 was the first significant global communicable disease challenge in the era of a changing information ecosystem. Traditional news coverage had declined in its reach, replaced by widespread distribution of news and information on social media and other digital services.
In early 2020, the rise of COVID‑19 cases and deaths in Australia saw a corresponding increase in demand for information and an overwhelmingly massive amount of data, media and commentary from a variety of sources. The Australian Government can only control its own communications, but needed to be aware of, and responsive to, the changing media landscape in agile ways in the pandemic. The modern information landscape means everyone lives in increasingly different information ecosystems depending on their socio‑cultural background, age, gender and health risk.
The Australian Government actively addressed Australians' communication needs by communicating major National Cabinet decisions through media releases and press conferences, publishing Australian Health Protection Principal Committee updates on the virus and disease, increasing its social media presence and undertaking national communications campaigns. Government departments also produced messages on economic and other support measures. However, the Australian Government and state and territory governments often competed rather than collaborated to provide official information to the public that was clear and digestible amongst the overwhelming amount of information that was publicly available.
While there were positive aspects to its early communications approach, there were opportunities for improvement in future national communication strategies.
Attempts to achieve a nationally cohesive approach fell short, and communications did not meet the expectations of the public, community sector or industry. A key contributing factor was the perceived inconsistencies in the approach to the development and implementation of pandemic response measures across jurisdictions. National communications did not adequately address or explain why these inconsistencies were occurring, allowing confusion and mistrust to develop.
The speed that information was communicated was also an issue. Evidence and public health orders changed quickly, sometimes daily. While advice sought to be responsive to rapidly changing circumstances, the scale and speed of complex information being released added to confusion as individuals and communities wanted a clear answer about 'what this means for me and why'. This information was often not available when the announcements were made, and it was unclear which level of government was responsible for its communication.
There were instances when a more transparent approach was required in order to maintain trust amongst the general public. When the government placed limits on experts and advisory groups in engaging with the public, this fuelled distrust amongst Australians and allowed commentary on the pandemic and response measures to be undertaken by everyone except the experts best placed to explain.
Vaccine communication was one area where significant confusion and mistrust developed in the absence of clear communication from the government. The roles and responsibilities of the Australian Technical Advisory Group on Immunisation (ATAGI) as a medical expert advisory body and of the government in communicating decisions were not clearly enough defined, and a lack of pre‑existing communication experience within ATAGI undermined efforts to communicate advice that was complex and changing due to emerging evidence and virus activity. The panel considers that in addition to having more defined roles and communication expertise, the existence of an Australian Centre for Disease Control performing this expert communications role during the pandemic would have mitigated some of the confusion that developed.
Messaging needed to be tailored to meet the needs of various groups within the population, including priority populations, people with specific risks, those with differing information needs, and businesses. This also demanded a capacity not easily met by government. Voluntary efforts by community organisations were relied on, often without additional funding or at the cost of other community supports they might have been able to provide.
A number of Disability Representative Organisations developed information resources tailored to people with disability, including webinars about the vaccine rollout for people with intellectual disability and their families and carers. Culturally and linguistically diverse community organisations produced translated materials, and bilingual and bicultural intermediaries undertook vital outreach activities. There were examples of local radio in some Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities incorporating community services and broadcasting church and funeral services into programming when travel restrictions were in place.
While government communications with priority populations improved over time, communications generally relied on a universal communications approach and was therefore not simple, accessible or meaningful for all audiences. For example, Operation COVID Shield's first major campaign used the slogan 'Arm yourself against COVID‑19' to encourage people to get vaccinated. However, this message was considered confronting and alienating, particularly for some culturally and linguistically diverse and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities. While the slogan was adapted to 'Protect yourself' for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities, many people in these communities were still exposed to the 'arm yourself' slogal through mainstream media.
Health has long been an area where misinformation is rife, and this was factored into the national health communication approach from the beginning of the pandemic. The widespread use of social media and digital technologies facilitated the rapid spread of misinformation and disinformation. This lead to issues such as vaccine hesitancy and people taking ineffective treatments not backed by science. In response, the government focused strategic communications on sharing evidence‑based information and leveraged expertise in academia and communities. While necessary to build community understanding and prevent information voids, the government's approach did not access the full suite of potential actions available.
In this evolving area, initiatives to address misinformation and disinformation through literacy building, proactive communications, and regulatory approaches, as well as important longer‑term initiatives to build societal resilience, are important.
Lessons for a future pandemic
Rebuilding public confidence in the Australian Government's communications is a critical component of the next pandemic response.
A pandemic creates a complex information environment in which to communicate. To effectively address this challenge, the Australian Government should ensure approaches are well designed, follow established principles, incorporate new evidence‑based techniques, and are delivered in ways that meet the needs of the audience.
A joint approach between all levels of government is needed to ensure national consistency while maintaining sufficient flexibility to communicate the rationale behind different response measures. This is especially important when there are major shifts in the strategic direction or where there are perceived inconsistencies between jurisdictions.
Australian Government coordination and information‑sharing mechanisms must be able to provide individuals, businesses and communities with a clear explanation about what measures mean for them and why they are being used.
Governments should tailor communication to different populations from the very beginning of an emergency. Achieving this requires governments to prioritise two‑way communications, use relationships and implement agile funding for community‑led delivery.
To ensure community input, partnerships must be established to ensure communities feel heard and valued and see their views reflected in the policies enacted by government.42
Communication should be shared through trusted community channels, and experts should reflect the diversity in the community so people can relate to the messenger, and so the communicator can tailor the response to the community context.
Governments should enable scientific sources and experts to communicate highly nuanced advice and evidence to the public in their role as some of the most trusted communicators of information. This approach should be supported by highly trained communication teams and experts from the public service and academia.
Governments must proactively plan for misinformation and disinformation to occur and work with health, communication and misinformation experts to strategically address these issues. This should be supported by using a range of other tools and evidence‑based approaches that may be deployed in a crisis and focusing on longer‑term community resilience‑building activities.
Back to topImmediate actions
In order to support effective communication in a pandemic response, the Inquiry has identified the following immediate action to be completed over the next 12 to 18 months:
- Develop a communication strategy for use in national health emergencies that ensures Australians, including those in priority populations, families and industries, have the information they need to manage their social, work and family lives.