The operating environment during the alert phase of a pandemic involves high levels of uncertainty, and there is an imperative for governments to act without the level of evidence that would normally apply. The more evidence that is available to decision‑makers, the more confident they can be in their actions. Achieving the best possible outcomes requires interoperable data systems, investment in the capacity to collect and synthesise evidence, and a commitment to ongoing evaluation and evidence‑based decision‑making to ensure proportionality is achieved and maintained.

At the start of the pandemic there was limited knowledge about the origin of the virus, the method of transmission, the mechanism by which the virus caused illness and death, who was most at risk of severe disease, and the most effective treatment options. It was also unclear whether it would be possible to develop a vaccine. This required operating under the ‘better safe than sorry’ precautionary principle, which does not necessarily require evidence to act but prioritises protecting lives.

Moving to an evidence‑based risk approach requires real‑time evidence relevant to the Australian context. In the early stages of the pandemic, a lack of sufficiently detailed Australian data meant that epidemiologists, modellers and other experts relied on international data that did not necessarily reflect the risk profile or disease dynamics in Australia. The more Australia’s experience of COVID‑19 deviated from that of the rest of the world, particularly from Europe and the UK, where the data we heavily relied upon originated, the bigger the issue became. The accessibility and security of data was also an issue, with case and close contact data being recorded in Australia in hard copy and relayed to recipients by fax machines in some jurisdictions.

Data availability improved through the pandemic as Australian Government departments collaborated with each other, and with state and territory governments, to create, share and link datasets, building a more complete picture of the pandemic. This required overcoming entrenched barriers to data‑sharing and innovation to create new data systems. The evidence base this created was invaluable to decision‑makers.

Particular successes included:

• the Department of Health’s rapid integration of multiple datasets held across different Australian Government departments, different jurisdictions and providers in order to increase understanding of vaccine uptake, drive research on the effectiveness of the COVID‑19 vaccine and inform other tailored response measures, including for priority populations
• the Treasury obtaining credit card spending data from banks and mobility data from private companies like Google to monitor the effectiveness of lockdowns in reducing activity, and the economic impact of restrictions and response measures
• the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) linking Australian Taxation Office, Treasury and ABS Multi‑Agency Data Integration Project and Census data so that the Treasury could understand how coming off JobKeeper affected individuals
• the use of wastewater testing to detect COVID‑19 at the local population level or on aircraft. The results signalled where public officials should target public health messaging and helped identify asymptomatic cases and new variants on incoming flights.²²

However, gaps remained, particularly regarding the impact on different cohorts of Australians and the greater investment needed in interoperable data systems to provide the evidence to underpin a more effective, tailored, evaluated and equitable pandemic response. To this day, COVID hospitalisation counts – an important measure of impact – do not mean the same thing in different jurisdictions and so cannot be directly compared.

Inadequacies in disability data impacted governments’ ability to develop tailored response measures, understand the extent of cases and deaths, or monitor the rollout of vaccinations. This is concerning given that some people with disability have a greater risk of acquiring COVID‑19 and are more likely to have serious health consequences as a result. During the Delta wave, people receiving the Disability Support Pension and National Disability Insurance Scheme participants were 3.1 and 2.8 times more likely than the general population to be admitted to intensive care units with COVID‑19. These rates increased to 4.7 and 4.8 times respectively in the first Omicron wave. While data linkages were created to track the vaccine rollout amongst some people with a disability, there is no longer a clear picture on vaccine coverage among this group. Regular boosters remain an important protective measure for people vulnerable to more severe COVID‑19, and understanding where uptake is dwindling would help prioritise public health community engagement efforts.

Evaluation is a critical component of ensuring that government pandemic response measures are effective and remain appropriate in changing conditions. The Australian National Audit Office continued to undertake audits throughout the pandemic but adjusted their approach to account for changing circumstances. This helped ensure accountability while not losing the value of the audit function.

Public health interventions similarly required – but often lacked – real‑time evaluation on implementation. A number of the more contentious measures, such as enforced quarantine, curfews and closing outdoor playgrounds, were not supported by pre‑existing evidence, and would have benefited from being tested with epidemiologists and behavioural experts, and evaluated in real time to ensure proportionality.

There were also a number of economic response measures that had not previously been used in Australia. In particular, the pandemic saw the first use of a wage subsidy in the form of the JobKeeper payment. This represented the single biggest program by annual government spending in Australia’s history, and the three‑month review of the program allowed changes that improved its operation during its second phase.

A post-pandemic evaluation of JobKeeper was also undertaken, strengthening future preparedness and ensuring detailed lessons have been learned. However, outside JobKeeper and the Reserve Bank of Australia’s reviews of their extraordinary monetary policy measures, a range of other significant economic programs – including the $35.9 billion Boosting Cash Flow for Employers program – have not been formally evaluated. Reviewing the full range of response measures deployed would maximise and consolidate the learnings for a future pandemic.